Bu çalışma, Kanûnî Sultan Süleyman’a (1520-1566) ithaf edilen müellifi meçhul bir umûr-ı âmme risâlesini merkeze alarak umûr-ı âmme sorununa odaklanmaktadır. Fahreddîn Râzî ile başlayan dönem ve sonrasında kaleme alınan felsefe ve daha özelde kelâm eserlerinde müstakil bir başlık hüviyetine kavuşan umûr-ı âmme, tanımlanmasına ve kapsamına yönelik birtakım farklı fikirlerin öne sürüldüğü bir alan olmuştur. Bu tanımlama çabaları arasında etkisini sonraki yüzyıllarda da gösteren ve kendine birçok taraftar bulanı özgülük temelli yorumdur. Umûr-ı âmmenin ne olduğu sorusunu mevcudun kısımlarıyla irtibatlı bir şekilde özgü olmamak şeklinde yanıtlayan bu anlayış, özgü olmamanın hangi yönde ve ne şekilde gerçekleşeceği hususlarındaki görüş farklılığı neticesinde düşünürlere göre değişkenlik göstermiştir.
XVI. yüzyılda kaleme alınan ve müellifine dair bir kayda rastlanmayan umûr-ı âmme risâlesi, Îcî tarafından el-Mevâkıf’ta dile getirilen özgülük temelli yoruma yeni ve farklı bir açılım getirme, hem mahiyet hem de kapsamı cihetiyle umûr-ı âmmeyi daha önceki alımlanış tarzlarından farklı ele alma iddiası taşımaktadır. Makale, XV. ve XVI. yüzyıllarda Osmanlı topraklarında umûr-ı âmmeye dair tartışmaların bağlamını ortaya koyma ve zikredilen risâlenin başta özgülük temelli tanımı olmak üzere diğer bakış açılarından ne oranda ayrıştığını göstermeyi hedeflemektedir. Ayrıca ele alınan konuların zeminini teşkil eden risâle metninin günümüze ulaşan tek nüshasından hareketle yapılan neşri ve tercümesi çalışmanın sonunda ek olarak sunulmaktadır.
The philosophical and more specifically theological books written in post-classical period of Islamic thought differed from previous philosophical texts in some characteristics. One of them was the manner in which the texts were composed. Arguably the most apparent part which the text of classical period were lack of was the section of al-umūr al-āmmah. Although it literally means general things it is equal to general metaphysics which cover the essential attributes of the subject matter of metaphysics, i.e. being qua being.
This article focuses on al-umūr al-āmmah (general metaphysics) discussed in an anonymous treatise dedicated to Suleymān the Lawgiver (1520-1566). By the time of al-Rāzī (d. 606/1210) al-umūr al-āmmah sections began to take a central position in philosophical and theological works. It became an independent field of study in which its meaning and scope was refined. Many thinkers including al-Īcī (ö. 756/1355), Ali Qushjī (d. 879/1474) and Kara Saydī (d. 912/1507) prefered to define al-umūr al-āmmah on the basis of unpeculiarity. For them what makes a thing belonging to the class of concepts known as al-umūr al-āmmah is whether or not it is reducible to one of the three parts of being namely necessary, substance or accident. There were variying views according to the philosophcal and theological diversity among thinkers in defining the direction of reduciblity.
Jurjānī, in his magnum opus Sharh al-Mawāqif interpreted al-Īcī’s (ö. 756/1355) definition of al-umūr al-āmmah which had taken unpeculiarity as a basis of it as “what encompasses topics that are participating in, yet not reducible to, one specific division of being”. For Jurjānī the unpeculiarity was equal to encompassing. Although his interpretation was dominant among the commentators there were other opinions which had highlighted irreducibility rather than encompassing.
One of those who insisted the irriducible character of al-umūr al-āmmah was the anonymous author of the treatise of al-umūr al-āmmah. He claims that the reception of the theory of irreducibility was not appropriate with its original form introduced primarily by al-Īcī in his al-Mawāqif in the very begining of the section devoted to al-umūr al-āmmah. For him, the definition of al-umūr al-āmmah in al-Mawāqif is sufficient to cover the concepts as necessity by itself (al-wujub al-zhātī) or pre-eternity (al-qidam). On the other hand, Jurjānī declared that the definition did not cover them as they were reduced to one specific division of being i.e. Necessary being. As fort the author of the treatise of al-umūr al-āmmah, both the necessity by itself and pre-eternity should be regarded among al-umūr al-āmmah.
The author of the treatise argues that what should not be reduced is not al-umūr al-āmmah, as expected literally from the text and interpreted by the most of thinkers such as Jurjānī, but rather the parts of existents (aqsām al-mawjūdāt) namely Necessary, substance and attribute, should not be reduced to al-umūr al-āmmah. Based on this idea, he concluded that there is no confliction between to say that the necessity by itself and pre-eternity are of al-umūr al-āmmah and that to describe al-umūr al-āmmah as what is not reducible. For him, the subject of irreducibility is the part of being not al-umūr al-āmmah.
Based on his specific view on al-umūr al-āmmah, he criticized some thinkers who commented al-Īcī’s definition. Among them Jurjānī, probably for his influence on later thinkers, is the center of his critics. He commented almost every sentence of him in this short treatise. For example he does not agree with Jurjānī when he described al-umūr al-āmmah as the predicates attributed to the external things (mahmūlāt). He then criticized Ottoman eminent philosopher Hatībzāde Muhyiddīn Mehmed Efendi (d. 901/1496) through his commentary on Tajrīd al-‘aqāid of al-Tūsī (672/1274). One of those who is criticized by the author of the treatise, is Hasan Çelebī al-Fenārī through his glosses on Sharh al-Mawāqif of Jurjānī.