SÖYLEM, FİNANSAL GÜÇ VE ZORLAYICI DİPLOMASİ: RAHİP BRUNSON KRİZİNDE TÜRKİYE–ABD İLİŞKİLERİ

Öz

Bu makale, 2017–2019 yılları arasındaki Brunson krizini, ABD–Türkiye ilişkilerinde söylem temelli zorlayıcı diplomasi çerçevesinde analiz etmekte; diplomatik söylem, finansal kırılganlık ve piyasa oynaklığı arasındaki etkileşimi disiplinlerarası bir yaklaşımla incelemektedir. Mevcut literatür Brunson krizini büyük ölçüde diplomatik müzakereler, yaptırım politikaları ve ikili ilişkilerde güven krizi bağlamında ele almış olmakla birlikte, diplomatik söylemin finansal piyasalar üzerindeki stratejik etkisi sınırlı ölçüde incelenmiştir. Bu çalışma, diplomatik söylemlerin yalnızca politik iletişim araçları olarak değil, aynı zamanda ekonomik açıdan kırılgan devletlerde finansal maliyetler üreten stratejik sinyaller olarak işlev gördüğünü ileri sürmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, kriz dönemi boyunca liderler ve kurumsal aktörler tarafından üretilen diplomatik açıklamalar sistematik biçimde kodlanarak Söylem Temelli Diplomatik Gerilim Endeksi (DTI) oluşturulmaktadır. Bu yönüyle çalışma, zorlayıcı diplomasi literatürüne finansal piyasa boyutunu dâhil ederek ve ABD–Türkiye ilişkilerinde söylem, finansal kırılganlık ve dış politika baskısı arasındaki etkileşimi vurgulayarak özgün bir katkı sunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Rahip brunson
• finansal güç
• söylem analizi
• Türkiye-ABD ilişkileri
• zorlayıcı güç

Discourse, Financial Power, and Coercive Diplomacy: Turkey-US Relations in the Pastor Brunson Crisis

Öz

This article analyzes the Brunson crisis (2017–2019) within the framework of discourse-based coercive diplomacy in U.S.–Turkey relations, examining the interaction between diplomatic discourse, financial fragility, and market volatility through an interdisciplinary approach. While the existing literature has largely addressed the Brunson crisis in terms of diplomatic negotiations, sanction policies, and the crisis of trust in bilateral relations, the strategic impact of diplomatic discourse on financial markets has been examined only to a limited extent. The study argues that diplomatic discourses function not merely as instruments of political communication but also as strategic signals that generate financial costs in economically fragile states. Accordingly, diplomatic statements produced by leaders and institutional actors throughout the crisis period are systematically coded to construct a Discourse-Based Diplomatic Tension Index (DTI). In this respect, the study makes an original contribution to the coercive diplomacy literature by expanding it to include the financial market dimension and by highlighting the interaction between discourse, financial fragility, and foreign policy pressure in U.S.–Turkey relations.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• pastor brunson
• financial power
• discourse analysis
• Turkey-US relations
• coercive diplomacy

Kaynakça

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