New Constitutionalism and Constitutionalism of International Capital Movements

Öz

This article examines the “newconstitutionalism” of the freemovement of capital at the International Monetary Fund (IMF) after the 2007global economic crisis. It is argued that the concept of new constitutionalism, as it is defined by Stephe nGill, is a valuable concept to describe the growing institutionalization of neoliberal policies in constitutions, laws, institutions and regulations. The freemovement of capital across borders is essential in new constitutionalism. As such, a patchwork of bilateral, regional and global regulations has come into existence that try to institutionalize full international capital mobility. The latest attempt to further extend the constitutionalization of the free movement of capital is a 2011 framework for dealing with capital inflows designed by the IMF staff. However, opposition against this framework has materialized from emerging markets and developing countries. As such, the ability of developed countries to further extend the new constitutionalism of the freemovement of capital is severely weakened because of the risingpowers’ resistance.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• New Constitutionalism
• IMF
• Capital Controls
• Neoliberalism
• Emerging Markets

Yeni Anayasacılık ve Uluslararası Sermaye Hareketlerinin Anayasallaştırılması

Öz

Bu makale 2007küresel ekonomik krizinden sonra İMF çerçevesinde şekillenen sermayenin serbest hareketinin yeni anayasacılıkla olan ilişkisini ortaya koyma amaçlıdır. Stephen Gill tarafından tanımlanan yeni anayasacılığın, neoliberal politikaların anayasalar, kanunlar, kurumlar ve düzenlemeler yoluyla kurumsallaştırılmasının artırılmasını açıklayan değerli bir kavram olduğu tartışılacaktır. Sınırları aşan sermayenin serbest hareketi yeni anayasacılık için çok önem taşımaktadır. Öyle ki iki taraflı, bölgesel ve küresel düzenlemeler “uluslararası sermayenin tam hareketi”ni sağlamaya çalışan gayretlerdir. 2011’deki sermayenin serbest hareketini daha fazla anayasallaştırılma teşebbüsleri ise İMF tarafından tertip edilmiş, sermaye giriş çıkışları ile ilgili oluşumlardır. Ancak bu oluşumlara yükselen piyasa ve gelişmekte olan ülkelerden karşı çıkışlar olagelmektedir. Bu karşı çıkışların şiddeti o kadar artmıştır ki sermayenin serbest hareketini yeni anayasacılık çerçevesinde genişletmek isteyen gelişmiş ülkelerin bu çabası zayıflatılmış bulunmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Yeni Anayasacılık
• İMF
• Sermaye Kontrolleri
• Neoliberalizm
• Yükselen Piyasalar

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