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Vergi Ahlakının Teorik Çerçevesi

Yıl 2011, Cilt: 20 Sayı: 2, 259 - 277, 01.06.2011

Öz

Taxpayers are not pleased with tax and therefore many undesired behaviors like tax evasion emerge Tax morale as being one of the factors determining the behaviors of the taxpayers against tax is defined an instinct motivation for paying taxes Tax morale is closely related to tax compliance There are several social and physiological factors that are closely related to tax compliance and therefore to tax morale and these factors determine the form of tax morale The aim of this article is to explain the concept of tax moral and to define the factors that are related to tax moral In this context social and physiological factors such as social norms guilt and shame duty and fear intrinsic motivation taxpayers’perception of the fairness relation between taxpayer and government are evaluated in detail Keywords: Tax Morale Tax Compliance Tax Physiology

Kaynakça

  • Allingham, Michael G. Ve Sandmo, Agnar (1972), “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis”, Journal of Public Economics, Nov.,1, 323-338
  • Alm, J., Jackson, B. R. ve McKee, Michael (1992), “Estimating The Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance with Experimental Data”, National Tax Journal, 45(1), 107-114
  • Alm, J. ve Torgler, B. (2006), “Culture Differences and Tax Morale in The United States and Europe”, Journal of Economic Psychology, 27(2), 224-246 Pierre http:\\www.bbs.knue.ac.kr/~edupolicy/lib._.brd/_1.116_/education.pdf , Erişim Tarihi 04.04.2010 Forms Of Capital”,
  • Fehr, Ernst ve Gächter, Simon (1998), “Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic Implications of Homo Reciprocans”, European Economic Review, 42(3-5), 845-859
  • Feld, Lars P. ve Kirchgässner, Gebhard (2000), “Direct Democracy, Political Culture, and the Outcome of Economic Policy: A Report on the Swiss Experience”, European Journal of Political Economy, 16(2), 287-306
  • Feld, L. P. ve Frey, Bruno S. (2002), “Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers Are Treated”, Economics of Govarnance, 3(3), 87-99
  • Frey, Bruno S. ve Feld, Lars P. (2002), “Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis”, Cesifo Working Paper, 1-36
  • Gordon, James P. P. (1989), “Individual Morality and Reputation Costs As Deterrents to Tax Evasion”, European Economic Review, Vol. 33(4), 797-805
  • Graetz, Michael J. ve Wilde, Louis L. (1985), “The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact and Fantasy”, National Tax Journal, 38(3), 355-363
  • Hardin, Russell (1993), “The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust”, Politics & Society, 21(4), 505-529
  • Hirschman, Albert O. (1965), “Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi- Vanishing Act”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 13(4), 385-393
  • Kahneman, Daniel ve Tversky, Amos (1979), “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk”, Econometrica, Vol. 47(2), 263-291
  • Kelman, Herbert C. (1961), “Processes of Opinion Change”, Public Opinion Quarterly, 25(1), 57-78
  • Knack, Stephen ve Keefer, Philip (1997), “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1251-1288
  • Myles, Gareth D. ve Naylor, Robin A. (1996), “A Model of Tax Evasion with Group Conformity and Social Customs”, European Journal of Political Economy, 12(1), 49-66
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell ve Shavell, Steven (2000), “The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law”, Journal of Economic Literature, 38(1), 45-76
  • Pommerehne, Werner W. ve Weck-Hanneman, Hannelore (1996), “Tax Rates, Tax Administration and Income Tax Evasion in Switzerland”, Public Choice, 88(1-2), 161-170
  • Roth, J. A., Scholz, J. T. ve Witte, A. D. (1989), Taxpayer Compliance, Vol. 1, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
  • Schaltegger, Cristoph A. ve Torgler Benno (2007), “Government Accountability and Fiscal Discipline: A Panel Analysis Using Swiss Data”, Journal of Public Economics, 91(1-29), 117-140
  • Scholz, John T. ve Pinney, Neil (1995), “Duty, Fear and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior”, American Journal of Political Science Economics, V(2) 490-512
  • Scholz, John T. ve Lubell, Mark (1998), “Adaptive Political Attitudes: Duty, Trust, and Fear as Monitors of Tax Policy”, American Journal of Political Science, 42(3), 903-920
  • Schmölders, Günter (1970), “Survey Research in Public Finance: A Behavioral Approach to Fiscal Theory”, Public Finance, 25, 300-306
  • Schmölders, Günter (1976), Genel Vergi Teorisi (Çev. Salih Turhan), İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası
  • Sen, Amartya K. (1977), “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory”, Philosophy And Public Affairs”, 6(4), 317-344
  • Slemrod, Joel (1998), “On Voluntary Compliance, Voluntary Taxes, and Social Capital”, National Tax Journal, 51(3), 485-491
  • Song, Y. ve T. E. Yarbrough, (1978), “Tax Ethics and Taxpayer Attitudes: A Survey”, Public Administration Review, 38(5), 442-452
  • Spicer, Michael W. ve Becker, Lee A. (1980), “Fiscal Inequity and Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach”, National Tax Journal, 33(2), 171-175
  • Strümpel, B. (1969), “The Contribution of Survey Research to Public Finance”, In A.T. Peacock (ed.), Quantitative Analysis in Public Finance, New York: Praeger, 14-32
  • Torgler, Benno (2004), “Tax Morale in Asian Countries”, Journal of Asian Economics, 15(2), 237-266
  • Torgler, Benno (2007), Tax Compliance and Tax Morale: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, İngiltere: Edward Elgar, Cornwall
  • Vogel, Joachim (1974), “Taxation and Public Opinion in Sweden: An Interpretation of
  • Recent Survey Data”, National Tax Journal, 17(4), 499-513
  • Woolcock, Michael (1998), “Social Capital and Ecenomic Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework”, Theory and Society, 27(2), 151-208

VERGİ AHLAKININ TEORİK ÇERÇEVESİ

Yıl 2011, Cilt: 20 Sayı: 2, 259 - 277, 01.06.2011

Öz

Vergi, çoğunlukla yükümlüler tarafından hoş karşılanmamakta ve vergi
kaçakçılığı gibi pek çok istenmeyen davranış ortaya çıkmaktadır. Yükümlülerin vergiye
karşı olan davranışlarını belirleyen faktörlerden biri olan vergi ahlakı, vergi ödeme
konusundaki içsel bir motivasyon olarak tanımlanmaktadır. Vergi ahlakı, vergi uyumu
ile yakın ilişki içinde bulunan bir kavramdır. Vergi uyumu ve dolayısıyla vergi ahlakı ile
ilişkili pek çok sosyal ve psikolojik unsurlar bulunmakta ve bu unsurlar vergi ahlakını
şekillendirmektedir.
Bu çalışmanın amacı vergi ahlakı kavramını ve vergi ahlakı ile ilişkili
unsurları açıklamaktır. Bu kapsamda vergi ahlakı ile ilişkili olarak sosyal normlar,
suçluluk ve utanç duygusu, görev ve korku duygusu, içsel motivasyon ve yükümlülerin
adalet algısı, vergi yükümlüsü ve kamu otoritesi ilişkisi gibi sosyal ve psikolojik
unsurlar ayrıntılı bir biçimde incelenmektedir.

Kaynakça

  • Allingham, Michael G. Ve Sandmo, Agnar (1972), “Income Tax Evasion: A Theoretical Analysis”, Journal of Public Economics, Nov.,1, 323-338
  • Alm, J., Jackson, B. R. ve McKee, Michael (1992), “Estimating The Determinants of Taxpayer Compliance with Experimental Data”, National Tax Journal, 45(1), 107-114
  • Alm, J. ve Torgler, B. (2006), “Culture Differences and Tax Morale in The United States and Europe”, Journal of Economic Psychology, 27(2), 224-246 Pierre http:\\www.bbs.knue.ac.kr/~edupolicy/lib._.brd/_1.116_/education.pdf , Erişim Tarihi 04.04.2010 Forms Of Capital”,
  • Fehr, Ernst ve Gächter, Simon (1998), “Reciprocity and Economics: The Economic Implications of Homo Reciprocans”, European Economic Review, 42(3-5), 845-859
  • Feld, Lars P. ve Kirchgässner, Gebhard (2000), “Direct Democracy, Political Culture, and the Outcome of Economic Policy: A Report on the Swiss Experience”, European Journal of Political Economy, 16(2), 287-306
  • Feld, L. P. ve Frey, Bruno S. (2002), “Trust Breeds Trust: How Taxpayers Are Treated”, Economics of Govarnance, 3(3), 87-99
  • Frey, Bruno S. ve Feld, Lars P. (2002), “Deterrence and Morale in Taxation: An Empirical Analysis”, Cesifo Working Paper, 1-36
  • Gordon, James P. P. (1989), “Individual Morality and Reputation Costs As Deterrents to Tax Evasion”, European Economic Review, Vol. 33(4), 797-805
  • Graetz, Michael J. ve Wilde, Louis L. (1985), “The Economics of Tax Compliance: Fact and Fantasy”, National Tax Journal, 38(3), 355-363
  • Hardin, Russell (1993), “The Street-Level Epistemology of Trust”, Politics & Society, 21(4), 505-529
  • Hirschman, Albert O. (1965), “Obstacles to Development: A Classification and a Quasi- Vanishing Act”, Economic Development and Cultural Change, 13(4), 385-393
  • Kahneman, Daniel ve Tversky, Amos (1979), “Prospect Theory: An Analysis of Decision Under Risk”, Econometrica, Vol. 47(2), 263-291
  • Kelman, Herbert C. (1961), “Processes of Opinion Change”, Public Opinion Quarterly, 25(1), 57-78
  • Knack, Stephen ve Keefer, Philip (1997), “Does Social Capital Have an Economic Payoff? A Cross-Country Investigation”, Quarterly Journal of Economics, 112(4), 1251-1288
  • Myles, Gareth D. ve Naylor, Robin A. (1996), “A Model of Tax Evasion with Group Conformity and Social Customs”, European Journal of Political Economy, 12(1), 49-66
  • Polinsky, A. Mitchell ve Shavell, Steven (2000), “The Economic Theory of Public Enforcement of Law”, Journal of Economic Literature, 38(1), 45-76
  • Pommerehne, Werner W. ve Weck-Hanneman, Hannelore (1996), “Tax Rates, Tax Administration and Income Tax Evasion in Switzerland”, Public Choice, 88(1-2), 161-170
  • Roth, J. A., Scholz, J. T. ve Witte, A. D. (1989), Taxpayer Compliance, Vol. 1, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania
  • Schaltegger, Cristoph A. ve Torgler Benno (2007), “Government Accountability and Fiscal Discipline: A Panel Analysis Using Swiss Data”, Journal of Public Economics, 91(1-29), 117-140
  • Scholz, John T. ve Pinney, Neil (1995), “Duty, Fear and Tax Compliance: The Heuristic Basis of Citizenship Behavior”, American Journal of Political Science Economics, V(2) 490-512
  • Scholz, John T. ve Lubell, Mark (1998), “Adaptive Political Attitudes: Duty, Trust, and Fear as Monitors of Tax Policy”, American Journal of Political Science, 42(3), 903-920
  • Schmölders, Günter (1970), “Survey Research in Public Finance: A Behavioral Approach to Fiscal Theory”, Public Finance, 25, 300-306
  • Schmölders, Günter (1976), Genel Vergi Teorisi (Çev. Salih Turhan), İstanbul: Fakülteler Matbaası
  • Sen, Amartya K. (1977), “Rational Fools: A Critique of the Behavioral Foundations of Economic Theory”, Philosophy And Public Affairs”, 6(4), 317-344
  • Slemrod, Joel (1998), “On Voluntary Compliance, Voluntary Taxes, and Social Capital”, National Tax Journal, 51(3), 485-491
  • Song, Y. ve T. E. Yarbrough, (1978), “Tax Ethics and Taxpayer Attitudes: A Survey”, Public Administration Review, 38(5), 442-452
  • Spicer, Michael W. ve Becker, Lee A. (1980), “Fiscal Inequity and Tax Evasion: An Experimental Approach”, National Tax Journal, 33(2), 171-175
  • Strümpel, B. (1969), “The Contribution of Survey Research to Public Finance”, In A.T. Peacock (ed.), Quantitative Analysis in Public Finance, New York: Praeger, 14-32
  • Torgler, Benno (2004), “Tax Morale in Asian Countries”, Journal of Asian Economics, 15(2), 237-266
  • Torgler, Benno (2007), Tax Compliance and Tax Morale: A Theoretical and Empirical Analysis, İngiltere: Edward Elgar, Cornwall
  • Vogel, Joachim (1974), “Taxation and Public Opinion in Sweden: An Interpretation of
  • Recent Survey Data”, National Tax Journal, 17(4), 499-513
  • Woolcock, Michael (1998), “Social Capital and Ecenomic Development: Toward a Theoretical Synthesis and Policy Framework”, Theory and Society, 27(2), 151-208
Toplam 33 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil Türkçe
Bölüm Makaleler
Yazarlar

Handan Kaynar Bilgin Bu kişi benim

Yayımlanma Tarihi 1 Haziran 2011
Gönderilme Tarihi 29 Aralık 2013
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2011 Cilt: 20 Sayı: 2

Kaynak Göster

APA Bilgin, H. K. (2011). VERGİ AHLAKININ TEORİK ÇERÇEVESİ. Çukurova Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü Dergisi, 20(2), 259-277.