Fıkıh Faaliyetine Müfessirin Katkısı: Kâsânî’nin Bedâʾiʿu’ṣ-Ṣanâʾiʿinde Müfessir Yorumlarının İzleri
Öz
Tefsir ve fıkıh ilimlerinin birbirleriyle ilişkisi incelenirken genellikle tefsir usûlünün fıkıh usûlünden istifadeyle oluşturulduğu ve müfessirlerin, tefsir faaliyetlerinde bu usûle dayandığı dile getirilir. Buna bağlı olarak tefsir-fıkıh ilişkisinde fıkhın baskın bir karakter sergilediği ve bu ilişkide karşılıklı katkı sunma olgusunun daha ziyade fıkıhtan tefsire doğru bir seyir izlediği belirtilir. Bu yaygın kanaat genel olarak doğru olmakla birlikte fıkıh faaliyetine müfessirlerin katkısını yeterince dikkate almaması bakımından eksiktir. İşaret edilen eksikliğin giderilmesine yönelik bir çabanın ürünü olarak kaleme alınan bu makale, Bedâʾiʿu’ṣ-ṣanâʾiʿ adlı eserinde Kâsânî’nin (ö. 587/1191) müfessirlerden aktardığı Kur’ân yorumlarının, onun fıkıh faaliyetine ne ölçüde ve hangi açılardan katkı sağladığını tespit etmeyi amaçlamaktadır. Bu yönüyle araştırma, fıkıh ve tefsir ilimleri arasındaki etkileşimin mahiyetine müfessirin fakihe sunduğu katkı açısından ışık tutmaktadır. Deskriptif ve analitik yöntemlerin kullanıldığı çalışma neticesinde ulaşılan bulgulara göre müfessirler, ortaya koydukları tefsir izahlarıyla fakihlerin fıkhî üretim süreçlerine çeşitli şekillerde kayda değer katkılar sunmuşlardır.
Anahtar Kelimeler
Contribution of Exegetes to Juristic Activity: Traces of Exegetes’ Opinions in al-Kāsānī’s Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ
Öz
The thematic diversity of the Qur’an has necessitated that exegetes (mufassirūn) draw upon knowledge developed within other disciplines. Within this context, one of the fields with which Qur’anic exegesis (tafsīr) most frequently interacts is jurisprudence (fiqh). In scholarly discussions on the relationship between tafsīr and fiqh, it is often emphasized that the methodology of tafsīr was largely derived from uṣūl al-fiqh, and that exegetes regularly relied on the explanations of jurists (fuqahāʾ) and mujtahidūn, particularly when interpreting legal verses (āyāt al-aḥkām). From this perspective, the flow of influence has primarily moved from fiqh to tafsīr, leading scholars to argue that jurisprudence has played a dominant and formative role. While this view is generally valid, it presents an incomplete picture by underestimating the contribution of exegetes to the development of legal reasoning.
This study address this oversight by examining how Qur’anic interpretations cited from exegetes in al-Kāsānī’s (d. 587/1191) Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ contributed to his legal thought and methodology. The findings are expected to shed light on the nature of the intellectual exchange between fiqh and tafsīr—from the tafsīr perspective. Several reasons justify the selection of Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ for this purpose. First, al-Kāsānī was not an exegete and did not author an independent Qur’anic commentary. Although Carl Brockelmann attributed a work entitled Kitāb al-Taʾwīlāt to him, it has been established that this text actually belongs to the Sufi exegete ʿAbd al-Razzāq al-Kāshānī (d. 736/1335). Second, Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ is distinguished within the Hanafi furūʿ al-fiqh tradition for its highly systematic structure and methodological innovation, making it one of the most structured legal works of its time. A further reason for its selection is that no previous research has examined the exegetical citations in Badāʾiʿ al-Ṣanāʾiʿ in relation to their contribution to juristic reasoning.
The scope of this article is limited to exegetical interpretations that directly inform al-Kāsānī’s legal analysis. Other Qur’anic discussions not connected to the exegetical tradition fall outside its boundaries. Both descriptive and analytical methods were employed, with the resulting data analyzed throughout the relevant sections. The study shows that al-Kāsānī drew upon exegetical interpretations in multiple ways throughout his treatment of legal issues. His use of tafsīr was not confined to determining the meanings of particular words or phrases but also extended to reinforcing Hanafi legal arguments against other schools, conducting intra-madhhab critique, clarifying the context of rulings through references to asbāb al-nuzūl, identifying abrogated verses, and resolving interpretive ambiguities. Nonetheless, the role of exegetical material in al-Kāsānī’s legal reasoning appears largely explanatory and supportive rather than decisive. Moreover, his preference for collective attributions such as ahl al-tafsīr (“the scholars of exegesis”) and ahl al-taʾwīl (“the interpreters”) over individual names indicates that he prioritized widely accepted and established exegetical opinions within the established interpretive tradition.
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