THE IMPACT OF EXTERNAL AUDIT EFFECTIVENESS ON FISCAL PERFORMANCE: AN EMPIRICAL PANEL DATA ANALYSIS USING THE SYSTEM GMM APPROACH

Öz

With the new public financial management approach, all components of the budget process have moved beyond traditional patterns and adopted more functional, results-oriented and participatory missions within the framework of a modern management approach. Among these components, Supreme Audit Institutions have become one of the most important guarantees of budgetary rights through their external audit activities on behalf of parliaments. External audit activities, which initially focused on assessing the compliance of public expenditures with legal regulations and budgetary appropriations, have evolved into a more comprehensive framework that extends beyond ex-post financial control. In the contemporary context, external auditing takes a risk and performance-oriented perspective, which improves transparency and accountability, thereby contributing to the strengthening of fiscal discipline. This study examines the impact of external audit conducted by Supreme Audit Institutions on the primary budget balance using a panel data analysis covering 43 countries for the period 2006–2023. The index of the effectiveness of external audit was calculated by thematically grouping questions related to Supreme Audit Institutions in the Open Budget Survey dataset. These sub-themes were categorized as Audit Framework, Independence, Legislative Oversight and Public Oversight. Taking into account endogeneus risk and the lagged effects of variables, the analysis employed a two-step System Generalized Method Of Moments (System GMM) from dynamic panel data models. The findings reveal that as the effectiveness of external audit increases, the primary budget balance improves significantly, thus demonstrating that effective external audit is a key tool in terms of budget performance.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• External Audit Effectiveness
• Fiscal Performance
• Supreme Audit Institutions
• Budget Discipline
• Open Budget Survey

DIŞ DENETİMİN ETKİNLİĞİNİN MALİ PERFORMANS ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ: SİSTEM GMM YAKLAŞIMIYLA AMPİRİK BİR PANEL VERİ ANALİZİ

Öz

Yeni kamu mali yönetimi anlayışı ile birlikte bütçe süreçlerinin tüm bileşenleri klasik kalıplarının ötesine geçerek daha işlevsel, sonuç esaslı ve katılımcı misyonlar üstlenmişlerdir. Bu bileşenlerin başında gelen Yüksek Denetim Kurumları parlamentolar adına yerine getirdikleri dış denetim faaliyetleri ile bütçe hakkının en önemli teminatlarından birisi haline gelmiştir. Dış denetim faaliyetleri başlangıçta, kamu harcamalarının yasal düzenlemelere ve bütçe ödeneklerine uygun yapılıp yapılmadığına odaklanmışken, günümüzde harcama sonrası denetimle sınırlı kalmayıp, risk ve performans odaklı bir bakış açısıyla saydamlık ve hesap verebilirliği sağlayarak mali disipline katkı sunan bir yapıya evrilmiştir. Bu çalışmada 2006-2023 dönemine ilişkin 43 ülkeyi kapsayan bir panel veri analizi ile Yüksek Denetim Kurumları tarafından gerçekleştirilen dış denetimin etkinliğinin birincil bütçe dengesi üzerindeki etkisi araştırılmaktadır. Dış denetimin etkinliğine ilişkin endeks, Open Budget Survey veri setindeki yüksek denetim ile ilgili soruların tematik gruplandırılması yoluyla hesaplanmıştır. Bu alt temalar ise; Denetim çerçevesi, Bağımsızlık, Yasama Gözetimi, Kamuoyu Gözetimi olarak kategorize edilmiştir. İçsellik riski ve değişkenlerin gecikmeli etkileri de dikkate alınarak, analizde dinamik panel veri modellerinden iki aşamalı Sistem Genelleştirilmiş Momentler Yöntemi (Sistem GMM) kullanılmıştır. Elde edilen bulgular, dış denetimin etkinliği arttıkça birincil bütçe dengesinin anlamlı şekilde iyileştiğini dolayısıyla etkin bir şekilde yapılan dış denetimin bütçe performansı açısından kilit bir araç olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Dış Denetimin Etkinliği
• Mali Performans
• Yüksek Denetim Kurumları
• Bütçe Disiplini
• Open Budget Survey

Kaynakça

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