BİLGİ, REGÜLASYON VE REKABET: BİR PİYASA SÜRECİ YAKLAIMI

Yıl 2005, Cilt: 6 Sayı: 2, 253 - 267, 01.07.2005

Fuat Oğuz

Öz

Ekonomik regülasyon teorisi 1970lerde ortaya çıktı ve bugüne kadar varlığını sürdürdü. Şikago okulu iktisatçıları bu yeni araştırma alanının öncüleriydiler. Geçen otuz yıldan sonra regülasyon ekonomisi artık Şikago iktisatçılarının tekelinde değildir. Şikago yaklaşımı siyasetçi ve bürokratların şahsi çıkar güdüsüyle hareket ettikleri varsayımını başlangıç noktası yapar. Stigler, Peltzman ve diğerleri regülasyon süreçlerini bu yeni çatı altından incelerler. 1980lerden başlayarak, iki alternatif regülasyon yaklaşımı gelişmiştir: kamu tercihi okulu ve piyasa süreci teorisi. Kamu tercihi teorisi Tullock ve Buchanan'ın çalışmalarıyla başlar ve Şikago yaklaşımınınki gibi kamu çıkarı argümanlarını reddeder. Bununla birlikte, neo-klasik analiz araçlarını kullanmaya büyük ölçüde devam etmektedir ve statik rekabet teorisinin problemlerini sürdürmektedir. Regülasyona farklı bir yaklaşım Avusturya iktisat okulundan gelmektedir. Bu yazının amacı piyasa süreci teorisinin regülasyon ekonomisine bakışını tartışmaktır. Makalede ilk olarak, genel olarak piyasa süreci teorisi tartışılmış, sonra piyasa süreci teorisinin regülasyona bakışı analiz edilmiştir. Çalışma, piyasa süreci teorisinin regülasyona bakışının genel bir değerlendirmesinide yapmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Regülasyon, Avusturyan Okulu, Piyasa Süreci, Girişimcilik

KNOWLEDGE, REGULATION AND COMPETITION: A MARKET PROCESS APPROACH

Öz

The economic theory of regulation has been around since 1970s. Chicago school economists were pioneers in this new research area. After 30 years, economics of regulation is no longer under the monopoly of the Chicago economists. Chicago approach begins with the assumption that politicians and bureaucrats also follow their self-interests. Stigler, Peltzman and others study the regulatory processes under this new framework. Beginning with 1980s, two alternative schools developed theories of regulation: Public choice school and the market process theory. Public choice theory begins with Tullock and Buchanan’s works, and rejects public interest arguments like Chicago school. However, it uses mostly neo-classical toolbox and carries the same problems of static competition theory A different approach to regulation comes from the Austrian school. The goal of this paper is to discuss the relevance of the market process theory for the economics of regulation. To begin with, is discussed the nature of the market process theory. Then, is analyzed the market process approach to regulation. The paper ends with an assessment of the market process theory’s implications over regulatory issues.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Regulation, Austrian School, market process, entrepreneurship

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