YOLSUZLUKLARIN VERGİ GELİRLERİ ÜZERİNDEKİ ETKİSİ: DİNAMİK PANEL VERİ ANALİZİ

Yıl 2012, Cilt: 13 Sayı: 1, 41 - 51, 01.01.2012

Gökhan Dökmen

Öz

Kamu gücünün kişisel çıkarlar amacıyla kötüye kullanılması şeklinde tanımlanan yolsuzluklar; vergi kaçakçılığına, düzensiz vergi istisnalarına ve zayıf vergi idaresine yol açması durumunda vergi gelirlerinin azalmasına neden olabilir. Bu çalışmanın temel amacı, farklı vergi türlerinin yolsuzluklarla olan ilişkisini ortaya koymak ve hangi vergilerin yolsuzluk yapılmasına daha uygun olduğunu tespit etmektir. Çalışmada, yolsuzluklar ile vergi gelirleri arasındaki ilişki, 25 OECD üyesi ülkenin 1984-2007 yılları arasındaki verileri temel alınarak, sistem GMM yöntemiyle analiz edilmiştir. Yapılan bu analizde, yolsuzluklarla farklı vergi türleri arasında negatif ve istatistiksel açıdan anlamlı ilişkiler bulunmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Yolsuzluk, Vergi Gelirleri, Dinamik Panel Veri

THE EFFECTS OF CORRUPTION ON TAX REVENUE: A DYNAMIC PANEL DATA ANALYSIS

Öz

Corruption, defined as the misuse of public power for private benefit, can lead to decrease tax revenues since it causes to tax evasion, improper tax exemptions or weak tax administration. The main objective of this study is to demonstrate the relationship between corruption and various types of taxes and to determine which taxes are more appropriate for corruption. In this study, the relationship between corruption and tax revenue is analyzed by system GMM method, using 25 OECD countries’ yearly data for the period 1984-2007. The results show that there is a negative and statistically significant relationship between corruption and different types of taxes

Anahtar Kelimeler

Corruption, Tax Revenue, Dynamic Panel Data

Kaynakça

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