Günümüz Vekalet Savaşlarının Vekalet Kuramı Çerçevesinde İncelenmesi

Öz

Bir tarafın kendi amaçlarına ulaşmak için üçüncü bir tarafı kullandığı vekalet yüzyıllardır bilinmektedir, ancak vekalet savaşının kavramsallaştırma çalışmaları nispeten yenidir. Bu nedenle, bu çalışmada vekalet savaşı vekâlet teorisi açısından incelenerek değerlendirilmektedir. Vekalet teorisine göre, şirket sahibi, yetkisini başka bir kişiye (temsilciye) kendi adına karar vermesi için devreder. Taraflar arasında bilgi asimetrisi veya temsil edilen ile vekilin hedeflerinde farklılaşma varsa veya farklı risk paylaşım algıları varsa vekalet sorunu ortaya çıkar. Bu çalışmada, vekalet savaşında da benzer sorunların yaygın olduğunu ortaya konmaktadır. Yani, vekil ile vekili kullanan unsurun uyuşmayan amaçları/istekleri ve ilave olarak iki taraf arasında bilgi asimetrisi ve farklı risk algısı varsa, vekili kullanan unsur, vekil üzerindeki kontrolünü kaybedebilir veya vekili kullanan unsur, vekil ile olan ilişkisini kendi yararına kullanabilir, aynı şekilde vekil, vekili kullanan unsurdan farklı bir hareket tarzını tercih edebilir. Ayrıca vekâlet teorisinde ortaya konan ahlaki tehlike ve ters seçim problemlerine yönelik çözüm önerilerinin, vekâlet savaşı problemlerin çözümünde de kullanılabileceği ortaya konmaktadır. Söz konusu iki sorunu engellemek veya çözmek için vekalet savaşının tarafları arasında sonuç odaklı sözleşmeler üzerinde durulması ve güçlü bir bilgi altyapısının tesis edilmesi faydalı olacaktır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Vekalet teorisi
• vekalet savaşları
• ahlaki tehlike
• ters seçim

Destekleyen Kurum

Yoktur

Proje Numarası

Yoktur

Teşekkür

Yoktur

Modern-Day Proxy Warfare: From Agency Theory Perspective

Öz

Proxy warfare, in which one party uses a third party to achieve its own goals, are known for centuries, however, the conceptualization studies of proxy warfare are relatively new. Thereby, in this paper, we assess proxy warfare in terms of agency theory. According to agency theory, the owner of the company delegates their authority to another person (agent) to make decisions on their behalf. If there is information asymmetry between the parties or differentiation in the goals of the principal and the agent or they have different risk-sharing perceptions, agency problem exists. This study discloses that identical problems are common in proxy warfare. That is, if the principal and proxy have unmatching goals or desires accompanying information asymmetry and different risk perceptions, the principal may lose control of the proxy or the principal may exploit the proxy, likewise, the proxy may prefer a different way of action which is not compatible with the goals of the principal. However, this study shows that the remedies for agency theory’s “moral hazard” and “adverse selection” problems might be used in proxy warfare problems by establishing outcome-based contracts and a strong knowledge structure between the parties of proxy warfare.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Agency theory
• proxy warfare
• moral hazard
• adverse selection

Proje Numarası

Yoktur

Kaynakça

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