İÇSEL ZAMANLI KARMA OLİGOPOL PİYASALARI: REKABET, ÖZELLEŞTİRME VE REFAH

Öz

The objective of this study is to examine and evaluate mixed oligopoly model from theoretical standpoint. Time is considered as an exogenous factor in classical oligopoly models. The fact that time is an endogenous factor in classical oligopoly markets brings out different implications especially for welfare. A public firm’s competition with a private domestic (or a foreign) firm or both leads to different results. In that type of market, the city where a firm located is circular or linear shape closely affects the locations of the premises of the firm. A public firm must be a follower when price is regulated. A public firm should be follower when it is competing with a domestic private firm and a leader while it is competing with foreign private firm. A public firm should be privatized if it is not a monopoly. In the cases of partial privatization, the less the share of public firm, the more the privatized firms’ efficiency increases. If public firm has an objective of profit maximization instead of welfare maximization, welfare increases

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Mixed Oligopoly, Endogenous Timing, Stackelberg Leader, Subgame Perfect Nash Equilibria, Foreign Competitor, Privatization

İÇSEL ZAMANLI KARMA OLİGOPOL PİYASALARI: REKABET, ÖZELLEŞTİRME VE REFAH

Öz

Bu çalışmanın amacı karma oligopol modelini teorik açıdan inceleyip değerlendirmektir. Klasik oligopol modellerinde zaman dışsal olarak ele alınmaktadır. Karma oligopol piyasasında zamanın içsel olması özellikle refah açısından farklı sonuçlar doğurmaktadır. Bir kamu firmasının yalnızca yerli (yabancı) özel firmalarla ya da her ikisi ile birlikte rekabet etmesi farklı sonuçların ortaya çıkmasına neden olmaktadır. Bu piyasa türünde firmaların faaliyette bulunduğu şehrin dairesel veya doğrusal olarak kurulmuş olması firmaların yerleşkelerini yakından etkilemektedir. Kamu firması fiyat düzenlenmesinin olduğu bir durumda takipçi olmak zorundadır. Kamu firması yerli özel firmayla rekabet ederken takipçi, yabancı özel firmayla rekabet ederken lider olarak davranmalıdır. Kamu firmasının monopol olmadığı durumda özelleştirilmesi gerekmektedir. Kısmi özelleştirme olması durumunda kamu firmasının payı ne kadar az olursa özelleştirilen firmanın etkinliği o kadar fazla artmaktadır. Kamu firmasının refah maksimizasyonu yerine kar maksimizasyonunu amaçlaması ise refahı artırmaktadır

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Karma Oligopol, İçsel Zamanlama, Stackleberg Leader, Alt oyunlu Mükemmel Nash Dengesi

Kaynakça

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