BANKACILIK SEKTÖRÜNDE ASİMETRİK BİLGİ: SORUNLAR VE ÇÖZÜM ÖNERİLERİ

Yıl 2008, Sayı: 20, - , 20.06.2015

Meltem Erdoğan

Öz

The theory of markets with asymmetric information has been a vital and lively field of economic research for a long time. The models with imperfect information are the subjects that researchers have been focused on. In this market, banks are the lenders; individuals and firms are the borrowers. Lenders are believed to be not always in a position to know the true state of their borrowers and/or borrowers´ quality of investment projects although lenders would benefit from knowing the true characteristics of borrowers. Asymmetric information in credit markets may lead to market failure and has macro economic effects as a whole. In this study, we explore how asymmetric information and uncertainty can lead to failure in markets and how to overcome these problems

Anahtar Kelimeler

Asymmetric information, banking sector, adverse selection, moral hazard

BANKACILIK SEKTÖRÜNDE ASİMETRİK BİLGİ: SORUNLAR VE ÇÖZÜM ÖNERİLERİ

Öz

incelenmektedir. Tam olmayan bilgiye dayalı modeller araştırmacıların yoğunlaştığı alanlardır. Bir çok piyasa gibi kredi piyasalarında da asimetrik bilgi sorununa rastlanmaktadır. Bu piyasada genellikle bankalar kredi arz eden, kişi veya kurumlar ise kredi talep eden konumundadır. Bankaların kredi talebinde bulunan müşterileri veya müşterilerinin yatırım projeleri hakkında her zaman doğru bilgiye sahip olması mümkün değildir. Ancak sahip olmaları durumunda bankaların bu durumdan çok büyük avantaj sağlayacakları da kesindir. Kredi piyasalarında asimetrik bilgi sorunu sonucunda ters seçim ve ahlaki tehlike olmak üzere iki önemli sorun ortaya çıkmaktadır. Bu tür sorunların piyasa aksaklıklarına neden olduğu ve ekonominin işleyişini bozduğu görülmektedir. Bu çalışmada, kredi piyasalarında özellikle bankacılık sektöründe asimetrik bilginin yarattığı ters seçim ve ahlaki tehlike problemleri ve çözüm önerileri detaylı bir literatür taraması yoluyla tartışılmaya çalışılmıştır

Anahtar Kelimeler

Asimetrik bilgi, bankacılık sektörü, ters seçim, ahlaki tehlike

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