VEKÂLET SAVAŞLARINDA YÜKSELEN TREND: DEVLET SPONSORLUĞUNDA OLMAYAN VEKÂLET SAVAŞI

Yıl 2023, Sayı: 2, 147 - 189, 29.12.2023

Tarık Solmaz

https://doi.org/10.58685/dsd.1380217

Öz

Günümüzün vekâlet savaşları yalnızca küresel güçler veya bölgesel aktörler tarafından değil, aynı zamanda siyasi motivasyonlu devlet dışı silahlı aktörler tarafından da yürütülmektedir. Bununla birlikte mevcut literatürde vekâlet yoluyla savaş stratejisi çoğunlukla bir devlet aktörünün başka bir devlete ya da devlet dışı silahlı bir gruba sponsorluğu olarak algılanmaktadır. Dolayısıyla, vekâlet savaşına ilişkin mevcut anlayışlar, geleneksel olmayan vekâlet savaşı biçimlerini açıklamak için yeterli bir çerçeve sağlamamaktadır. Bu makale devlet sponsorluğunda olmayan vekâlet savaşını incelemektedir. Makalenin temel amacı, devlet sponsorluğunda olmayan vekâlet savaşına ilişkin bazı genel parametreleri ortaya çıkarmak ve böylece devlet sponsorluğunda olmayan vekâlet savaşının, devlet sponsorluğundaki vekâlet savaşından farklı olup olmadığını ve eğer öyleyse, ne ölçüde farklı olduğunu ortaya koymaktır. Bu amaçlar doğrultusunda, makale üç kısa örnek olayı incelemektedir: El-Kaide’nin Kuzey Kafkasya’daki radikal Selefi hareketlere sponsorluğu, Hizbullah’ın Yemenli Husilere sponsorluğu ve Leşker-i Tayyibe’nin Hint Mücahitlerine sponsorluğu. Çalışmanın bulguları devlet hamiliğinde olmayan vekâlet savaşının özü itibariyle devlet hamiliğindeki vekâlet savaşından farklı olmadığına bununla birlikte söz konusu aktörlerin vekilleriyle tesis ettikleri ilişki biçimleri arasında az da olsa farklılıklar bulunduğuna işaret etmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

vekalet savaşı, devlet dışı aktörler, el kaide, hizbullah, leşker-i tayyibe

Etik Beyan

Bu makale Small Wars Journal isimli çevrimiçi bir dergi için 21 Nisan 2022 tarihinde kaleme alınan “Non-State-Led Proxy Warfare: The Missing Link in the Proxy Wars Debate” isimli düşünce yazısının gözden geçirilmiş, güncellenmiş ve genişletilmiş versiyonudur.

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