UNLIKELY SCENARIO: HALT OF IRANIAN NUCLEAR PROGRAMME

Öz

This article analyzes if a change in domestic political dynamics might lead to a change of attitude toward abandoning Iranian nuclear programme, focusing on the attitudes of Iranian political factions, namely radical conservatives, pragmatic conservatives and reformists toward the Iranian nuclear programme. Presently, there is a common agreement among the political factions on how to continue on nuclear programme. Though this difference among attitudes is known, there has not been much literature on this issue. The article aims to show that even though there might be a change in the inner political dynamics, it would be a mistake to expect a great change in the official policy of Iran on nuclear programme. Iran will not halt its nuclear programme. The article argues that with the re-election of Mahmoud Ahmedinejad in the June 2009 presidential elections, in the short-term, there will not be any change in Iran‟s official attitude regarding its nuclear programme. Besides in the long-term, it is underlined that even if Ahmedinejad administration might be replaced by „reformists‟, Iran will not abandon its aim to achieve nuclear power, only there may be moderation in Iran‟s official rhetoric, and negotiations with the international community might improve.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Iran‟s nuclear programme, Iranian domestic politics, political factions in Iran

Kaynakça

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