Relationship of Political Rights And Corruptıon: A Panel Data Analysis

Öz

This study unlike previous studies aims to identify only the relationship between political rights and corruption by using the datas of 31 the least developed, 91 developing and 51 developed countries for a total of 173 countries for analysis of panel data for the period of 1995-2013. According to the Pedroni and Kao panel cointegration test and the Johansen-Fisher panel cointegration test long-term relationships between the political rights and corruption variables were determined. In addition, the findings of Granger causality analysis showed that political rights causes to corruption. According to the results of the fixed effect model a 1% increase in the political rights causes a 0,0603% reduction in the corruption. Therefore, it was found that the rise in political rights increases corruption considered 173 countries for the period of 1995-2013

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Political Rights, Corruption, Panel Data Analysis Granger Causality, Panel Cointegration Analysis.

Politik İstikrarsızlık ve Yolsuzluk İlişkisi: Bir Panel Veri Analizi

Öz

Politik istikrarsızlık ve yolsuzluk arasındaki ilişkiyi tespit etmeyi amaçlayan bu çalışmada 1995–2013 döneminde 31’i az gelişmiş, 91’i gelişmekte olan ve 51’i gelişmiş olmak üzere toplam 173 ülke için panel veri analizleri kullanılmıştır. Pedroni, Kao ve Johansen-Fisher panel eş-bütünleşme testi sonuçlarına göre politik istikrarsızlık ve yolsuzluk arasında uzun dönemli ilişki tespit edilmiştir. Ayrıca Granger nedensellik analizi bulguları ise politik istikrarsızlığın, yolsuzluğun nedeni olduğunu göstermiştir. Sabit etkili model tahmin sonuçlarına göre politik istikrarsızlıkta meydana gelecek %1’lik bir artış, yolsuzlukta %0,0603’lük bir azalma meydana getirmektedir. Dolayısıyla, 1995-2013 döneminde ele alınan 173 ülkede politik istikrarsızlıktaki artışın yolsuzluğu arttırdığı sonucuna varılmıştır

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Politik İstikrarsızlık, Yolsuzluk, Panel Veri Analizi, Granger Nedensellik, Panel Eş Bütünleşme Analizi.

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