Mediation Effect of the Governance Indicators in the Natural Resources Abundance and Economic Growth Relationship: Empirical Evidence from the MENA and Caspian Countries

Yıl 2015, Cilt: 15 Sayı: 3, 301 - 312, 01.08.2015

Emrah Eray Akça Harun Bal Mehmet Demiral

Öz

This study investigates the mediation effect of the governance indicators in the relationship between natural resources abundance and economic growth for 21 countries (N=21) from Middle East-North Africa (MENA) and Caspian regions, using 1996-2012 balanced annual (T=17) panel data sets. In this context, after estimating the impact of crude oil production per capita on real GDP per capita, hierarchical panel regression analysis is conducted to determine the mediation role of the institutions-based governance indicators in this relationship. Results from the pairwise regression estimations reveal that crude oil production per capita is negatively associated with worldwide governance indicators in general and the progressive improvements in all dimensions of governance indicators seem to promote the real GDP per capita growth. Results from the hierarchical regressions demonstrate that governance indicators play an important role as a partial mediator in the relationship between crude oil production and real GDP per capita. This evidence supports that governance indicators, weakened by natural resources abundance, tend to hinder natural resources abundance to contribute economic growth. Overall findings highlight the importance of integrated policies intended for preventing the corruption and violence, together with democratic, political and legal regulations to improve the institutional quality

Anahtar Kelimeler

Crude oil production, economic growth, worldwide governance indicators, mediation effect, hierarchical panel regression analysis

Doğal Kaynak Zenginliği ve Ekonomik Büyüme İlişkisinde Yönetişim Göstergelerinin Aracılık Etkisi: MENA ve Hazar Ülkelerinden Ampirik Bulgular

Öz

Bu çalışma, Orta Doğu-Kuzey Afrika (MENA) ve Hazar bölgesinden 21 ülke (N=21) için, doğal kaynak zenginliği ve ekonomik büyüme ilişkisinde yönetişim göstergelerinin aracılık etkisini, 1996-2012 dönemi yıllık dengeli panel verileri (T=17) kullanarak incelemektedir. Bu kapsamda, kişi başına ham petrol üretiminin kişi başına reel GSYH üzerine etkisi tahmin edildikten sonra, bu ilişkide kurumsal-temelli yönetişim göstergelerinin aracılık rolünü belirlemek için hiyerarşik regresyon analizi uygulanmıştır. İkili regresyon tahmin sonuçları, kişi başına ham petrol üretimi ile genel olarak küresel yönetişim göstergeleri arasında negatif bir ilişki olduğunu ve yönetişim göstergelerinin tüm boyutlarında meydana gelen gelişmelerin kişi başına reel GSYH’yı artırdığını göstermektedir. Hiyerarşik regresyon sonuçları, ham petrol üretimi ve kişi başına reel GSYH arasındaki ilişkide yönetişim göstergelerinin, kısmi bir aracı değişken olarak, önemli bir rol oynadığını göstermektedir. Bu bulgu, doğal kaynak zenginliğinin ekonomik büyümeyi artırmasının, bu zenginliğinin aynı zamanda yönetişim göstergelerini bozması nedeniyle engellenme eğiliminde olduğunu ortaya koymaktadır. Tüm sonuçlar, kurumsal niteliği geliştirecek demokratik, politik ve hukuki düzenlemeler ile birlikte yolsuzluğu ve şiddeti önlemeye yönelik bütünleşik politikaların önemine dikkat çekmektedir

Anahtar Kelimeler

Ham petrol üretimi, ekonomik büyüme, küresel yönetişim göstergeleri, aracılık etkisi, hiyerarşik panel regresyon analizi

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