Uluslararası Politik Ekonomi Bağlamında Devlet Kapasitesi: Elit Koalisyonları, Kurumlar, Büyüme ve Demokrasi

Öz

Bu makale, devlet kapasitesinin kökenlerini ve bunun ekonomik kalkınma ile demokrasiyi nasıl şekillendirdiğini, yapısalcı, kurumsalcı, kültürel ve agency temelli açıklamalarla karşılaştırmalı biçimde ele alır. Temel kuramsal çerçeve, sınıf ilişkileri, elit koalisyonlarının bütünlüğü ve uluslararası rekabet ile savaş gibi dış baskıların, kurumlar aracılığıyla idari ve altyapısal kapasitenin evrimini belirlediği varsayımına dayanır. Ana argüman, kalkınma ve demokratikleşme için belirleyici olanın baskıcı/cezalandırıcı kapasite değil, idari ve altyapısal kapasite olduğu; baskının ancak sivil idareye dönüştürülebildiğinde sınırlı bir fayda sağladığıdır. Çalışma, yüksek kapasitenin kaynak tahsisini disipline eden kurumları, mülkiyet haklarını ve hukukun üstünlüğünü güçlendirerek büyümeyi desteklediğini; temsil talebini artırıp elit–toplum pazarlığını kurumsallaştırarak demokratikleşmeyi mümkün kıldığını savunur. Sistemik kırılganlık, kaynak kıtlığı ve güvenlik tehditlerinin aynı anda kesişmesi, gelişmeci devletlerin doğuşunda kritik bir eşik oluşturur; bu sürecin yönünü ise tarihsel zamanlama ile iç ve dış bağlamların etkileşimi belirler.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Devlet Kapasitesi
• İdari ve Altyapısal Kapasite
• Ekonomik Kalkınma
• Demokratikleşme
• Elit Koalisyonları
• Kurumsal Tasarım ve Sistemik Kırılganlık.

State Capacity in the Context of International Political Economy: Elite Coalitions, Institutions, Growth, and Democracy

Öz

This article examines the origins of state capacity and how it shapes economic development and democracy, comparing structuralist, institutionalist, cultural, and agency-based explanations. The fundamental theoretical framework is based on the assumption that class relations, the integrity of elite coalitions, and external pressures such as international competition and war determine the evolution of administrative and infrastructural capacity through institutions. The main argument is that what is decisive for development and democratization is not repressive/punitive capacity, but administrative and infrastructural capacity; repression provides only limited benefit when it can be transformed into civil administration. The study argues that high capacity supports growth by strengthening institutions that discipline resource allocation, property rights, and the rule of law; and enables democratization by increasing the demand for representation and institutionalizing elite–society bargaining. The simultaneity of systemic vulnerability, resource scarcity, and security threats forms the critical juncture in the emergence of developmental states; the course of these processes is determined by the interaction between historical timing and the internal-external context.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• State Capacity
• Administrative and Infrastructure Capacity
• Economic Development
• Democratization
• Elite Coalitions
• Institutional Design
• and Systemic Fragility

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