From Neoclassic Economics to Behavioral Economics Tax Compliance: An Empirical Analysis

Öz

Tax compliance is the full and timely fulfillment of taxpayers' tax obligations voluntarily. The data of this study, which examines tax compliance from the perspective of behavioral economics, were obtained from 177 students studying in 5 different departments of Afyon Kocatepe University, Faculty of Economics and Administrative Sciences, by survey method. These data were subjected to OLS regression analysis. In general, the findings include tax compliance; population and work experience from demographic factors, loss aversion and risk level from non-economic factors, while tax rate, audit probability and penalties from economic factors do not. The most important finding is that among the factors affecting tax compliance within the scope of tax payment behavior, loss aversion from behavioral economics arguments is effective.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Tax Compliance
• Behavioral Economics
• Prospect Theory
• Loss Aversion.

Neoklasik İktisattan Davranışsal İktisada Doğru Vergi Uyumu: Ampirik Bir Analiz

Öz

Vergi uyumu, mükelleflerin vergisel yükümlülüklerini gönüllü olarak tam ve zamanında yerine getirmeleridir. Davranışsal iktisat perspektifinden vergi uyumunun incelendiği bu çalışmanın verileri anket yöntemiyle, Afyon Kocatepe Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesinin 5 ayrı bölümde eğitim gören 177 öğrenciden elde edilmiştir. Bu veriler OLS regresyon analizine tabi tutulmuştur. Genel olarak bulgular vergi uyumunu; demografik faktörlerden nüfus ve iş tecrübesinin, ekonomik olmayan faktörlerden kayıptan kaçınmanın ve risk düzeyinin etkilediğini gösterirken ekonomik faktörlerden vergi oranı, denetim olasılığı ve cezaların etkilemediğini göstermektedir. En önemli bulgu ise vergi ödeme davranışı kapsamında vergi uyumunu etkileyen faktörler arasında davranışsal iktisat argümanlarından kayıptan kaçınmanın etkili olduğudur.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Vergi Uyumu
• Davranışsal İktisat
• Beklenti Teorisi
• Kayıptan Kaçınma
• Tax Compliance
• Behavioral Economics
• Prospect Theory
• Loss Aversion.

Kaynakça

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