DAVETLE MÜDAHALE DOKTRİNİ VE MEŞRU MÜDAFAA HAKKI’NIN JUS AD BELLUM AÇISINDAN DEĞERLENDİRİLMESİ: TÜRKİYE’NİN LİBYA VE SURİYE MÜDAHALELERİ

Öz

Jus ad bellum kavramı, kuvvet kullanımının uluslararası hukuka uygunluğunu yorumlayan önemli bir kavramdır. Müdahale hukukunun eş anlamlısı olarak ele alınabilecek olan bu kavram, bir müdahalenin hukuka uygun olup olmadığı konusunda araştırmacılara yol göstermektedir. Mezkûr kavram, BM Andlaşması’nın meşru müdafaa hakkından bahseden 51. maddesi ile aynı andlaşmanın kuvvet kullanım yasağından söz eden 2/4. maddesi arasındaki hassas dengeler üzerine kurulu olup gerçekleştirilen müdahalelerin hukuki analizi olabildiğince bu iki önemli maddeye göre şekillendirilmektedir. Devletler egemenlik hakkına dayanarak bir devleti veya devlet dışı aktörü ülkesine davet edebilmekte ve bu yolla meşru müdafaa hakkına başvurabilmektedir. Ancak davete dayanmamakla birlikte meşru müdafaa hakkına dayandığı ifade edilen müdahaleler, jus ad bellum açısından önemli bir tartışma konusudur. Türkiye’nin Libya ve Suriye müdahaleleri ise davetle müdahale doktrini ve meşru müdafaa hakkının karşılaştırmalı olarak ele alınabileceği müstesna örneklerdendir. Bu çalışma da Türkiye’nin davete değil müdafaa hakkına dayanan Suriye müdahaleleri ile davete dayanan Libya müdahalelerini jus ad bellum açısından karşılaştırmalı olarak ele almayı amaçlamaktadır. Söz konusu çalışmada konuya ilişkin mümkün olduğu ölçüde uluslararası hukukun temel kaynakları öncelenerek bir yorum getirilmesi ve Türkiye’nin olası sorumluluğuna ilişkin bir kanaate varılması hedeflenmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• jus ad bellum
• meşru müdafaa hakkı
• davetle müdahale doktrini
• Libya müdahalesi ve Suriye müdahalesi

Öz

Jus ad bellum is a vitally important concept that determines whether the use of force conforms to international law. This concept guides researchers in determining the legality of an intervention and in this aspect, can be deemed as synonymous with the law of intervention. This concept depends on the delicate balance between Article 51 of the UN Charter, which deals with the right of self-defence, and Article 2/4 of the same Charter, which prohibits the use of force. These articles are crucial sources of jus ad bellum and form the fundamental basis for states’ use of force within the contexts of intervention by invitation and the right to self-defense. While the key criterion in the doctrine of intervention by invitation is the boundaries set by the host country, the fundamental conditions for the use of force in self-defence rely on the criteria of “urgency, necessity and proportionality”, which have been recognized as customary rules since the Caroline Incident. In intervention by invitation, it is seen that not only states, but also non-state actors can be invited by host country. On the other side, inviting states in non-international conflicts by a non-state actor under the claim of self-defence is not an adopted practice in international law. Indeed, the legal basis for states that intervened in Syrian territory without Damascus’s invitation is primarily based on the right to self-defence rather than the invitation from Syrian oppositions. In Libya, several states objected to Turkish intervention on the grounds that it was not in accordance with international law despite the fact that the intervention was conducted upon the request of the Government of National Accord of Libya. Most of the objections are stemmed from the argument that the Libyan Government of National Accord is not qualified to issue such an invitation and that Türkiye has no legitimate right respond to it. Furthermore, the nature of the intervention has altered, due to the violation of Turkish essential interests amidst the geopolitical conflicts in the Mediterranean. Therefore, this paper will assess the Turkish intervention by considering the premise that it was an action grounded in collective self-defence for Türkiye and Libya. On the other hand, interventions that are not based on an invitation, but are justified by the right of self-defence, remain a contentious issue in jus ad bellum. Given that Türkiye’s interventions in Syria based on the right to self-defence instead of invitation, it will be vitally important to evaluate these interventions within the context of “necessity, urgency and proportionality” criteria of the right to self-defence. Thus, during our assessments regarding Turkish interventions in Syria, we will consider various factors such as ungoverned territories, the substantial presence and terror attacks of illegal non-state actors as well as the documented and egregious violation of humanitarian law by the Syrian regime. Beyond these factors, Turkish interventions in the north of Syria are primarily justified by mass exodus of migration and the statehood ambitions of illegal non-state actors. However, Turkish interventions in Syria have sparked significant debate within the international community. Criticism has predominantly centered on their proportionality, rather than their necessity and urgency. In a nutshell, Turkish interventions in Libya and Syria serve as exceptional examples for discussing the comparative aspects of jus ad bellum. Therefore, this article aims to analyze Turkish interventions in Syria, based on the right of self-defence, and its intervention in Libya, relying on the invitation of the Government of National Accord comparatively within the context of jus ad bellum. This article is also to interpret the subject by giving precedence to the main sources of international law as much as possible and to reach a conclusion regarding Türkiye’s responsibility as a state.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• jus ad bellum
• self-defence right
• intervention by invitation
• Libya in-tervention

Kaynakça

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