The Interpretation of Akrasia in Terms of Practical Syllogism in Aristotle’s Ethics: Nicomachean Ethics 1147a33-1147b12

Öz

Almost the entirety of the Book VII of Aristotle’s Nicomachean Ethics deals with the concept of akrasia, which is generally defined as acting against one’s knowledge. In his investigation, Aristotle focuses on this definition and analyses what the knowledge of the akratic person could be. In this article, it is claimed that a coherent reading of his discussion of akrasia is possible if correct translations of “αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ” in 1147a33, “ἣ μὲν οὖν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο” in 1147a35, and “ἡ τελευταία πρότασις” in 1147b9 are provided. Accordingly, it will be asserted that the αὕτη in 1147a33 should be rendered as the minor premise. Moreover, it will be argued that translating “ἡ τελευταία πρότασις” in 1147b9 either as the minor premise or the conclusion does not have a significant effect on the explanation of the akratic action. Instead, what makes the difference in understanding this action lies in determining in what sense the akratic person has (or has not) what is articulated in this phrase, i.e. “ἡ τελευταία πρότασις.”

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Akrasia
• practical syllogism
• teleutaia protasis
• knowledge
• ignorance

ARİSTOTELES'İN NİKOMAKHOS'A ETİK ADLI ESERİNDE AKRASİA’NIN PRATİK TASIM ÜZERİNDEN YORUMLANMASI

Öz

Aristoteles’in Nikomakhos’a Etik adlı eserinin VII. kitabının neredeyse tamamı, genellikle kişinin bilgi sahibi olmasına rağmen bunun aksine davranması olarak tanımlanan akrasia kavramını ele almaktadır. Akrasia kavramını araştırırken Aristoteles kendisine bu tanımı esas alır ve akratik kişinin bilgisinin ne olabileceğini inceler. Bu makalede, bu tartışmanın tutarlı bir okumasının ancak 1147a33’teki “αὕτη δὲ ἐνεργεῖ,” 1147a35’teki “ἣ μὲν οὖν λέγει φεύγειν τοῦτο” ve 1147b9’daki “ἡ τελευταία πρότασις” ifadelerin doğru bir şekilde çevrildiklerinde mümkün olacağı ileri sürülmektedir. Bu doğrultuda, 1147a33’deki αὕτη sözcüğünü küçük öncül olarak çevirmenin gerekliliği ortaya konacak ve 1147b9’daki “ἡ τελευταία πρότασις” ifadesininse küçük öncül ya da sonuç olarak çevirilerinin akratik eylemin açıklanmasında bir fark yaratmadığı tartışılacaktır. Bu ifadenin farklı çevirileri yerine, akrasianın anlaşılması konusunda asıl fark yaratacak olanın, akratik kişinin bu ifadede dile getirilene ne yönden sahip olduğunun ya da olmadığının belirlenmesi olduğu iddia edilecektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Akrasia
• pratik tasım
• teleutaia protasis
• bilgi
• bilgisizlik

Kaynakça

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