Ruh, Bilinç ve Zombiler: Metafizik Çıkmazlar ve Alternatif Yollar

Yıl 2024, Sayı: 80, 172 - 205, 15.12.2024

Kayhan Özaykal

https://doi.org/10.58634/felsefedunyasi.1582240

Öz

Bu makale, zombiler örneği üzerinden metafizik ve fiziksel hakikat arasındaki ilişkiyi ele almaktadır. Felsefede zombi, fiziksel tüm açılardan insana benzeyen ancak bilinci olmayan bir organizmadır. Böyle bir varlığın mümkün olup olmadığı konusunda süregelen tartışmalar bulunmaktadır. Bu tartışmalar büyük ölçüde zombilerin tasavvur edilip edilemeyeceği meselesine bağlıdır ve bağlamda hayal veya tasavvur edilebilirliğin zorunlu olarak imkan anlamına geldiği fikri de çalışmada incelenmektedir. Tartışmalar, ruhun varlığı ve mahiyeti hakkındaki çalışmalar için de mühimdir. Genellikle zombilerin mümkün varlıklar olduğu görüşünü savunanlar düalist, mümkün olduklarını reddedenler ise materyalisttir. Bu çalışmada, tartışmada her iki tarafça kullanılan ana teorinin Kripke’nin mümkün dünyalar semantiği olması sebebiyle Kripke metafiziğine odaklanılmaktadır. Ancak burada Kripkeci metafiziğinin bu görüşlerin hiçbirinin doğruluğunu belirleyemeyeceği, çünkü gerekli türde bir zorunluluğu temellendiremeyeceği öne sürülmektedir. Böylece, literatürde temelden hatalı bir değerlendirme yapılmış gibi görünmektedir. Bunun yerine, geleneksel nedensel ve ontolojik türde bir metafiziğin daha etkili olacağı önerilmektedir ve özellikle bazı farklı nedensellik teorilerinin faydalı olacağı ileri sürülmektedir. Bu tür teorilerin konunun sonlandırıcı karara bağlanmasında etkili olabileceğini göstermek için gerçekçilik karşıtlığı, indeterminizm ve özellikle teistik iradecilik örneklerinden yararlanılmaktadır. Her teoride, zombi imkanını kesin olarak belirleyen cevaplar elde edilmektedir. Bu şekilde, bir materyalistin zombilerin mümkün varlıklar olduğunu kabul edebileceği görüşü ispatlanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Düalizm, Materyalizm, Determinizm, Kripke, Zombi, Bilinç

The Soul, Consciousness and Zombies: Metaphysical Impasses and Alternative Paths

Öz

This article aims to discuss the relationship between metaphysical and physical reality through the example of zombies. Zombies in philosophy are beings that are considered to be exactly like us physically, but still lack consciousness. There is ongoing controversy on the possibility of the existence of such entities. This debate is largely dependent on whether a zombie is conceivable or not, and the idea that conceivability necessarily implies possibility is subject to intense scrutiny. The debate is also important for the debate on the existence and nature of the soul. Generally, those that defend the view that zombies are possible entities are dualists, while those that reject their possibility are materialists. In this study, we focus on the use of Kripke’s metaphysics, as his possible world semantics has been a main theory used in the debate by both sides. However, it is argued that Kripkean metaphysics is able to determine the truth of neither view, as it cannot ground the needed type of necessity. Thus, it appears that a major misstep has been made in the literature. Instead, it is proposed that a metaphysics of the traditional causal and ontological type will more effective, and it is suggested that certain different theories of causality will be crucial. We use specifically the examples of antirealism, indeterminism and especially theistic voluntarism, to show that such theories can decide the matter. In these cases, we gain answers that determine with certainty the possibility of zombies. In this way, we defend the view that a materialist can accept that zombies are possible existents.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Dualism, Materialism, Determinism, Kripke, Zombie, Consciousness

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