Russian Volunteer Warriors and Emergence of Private Military Companies in Russia

Öz

Starting with the Egyptians in the Ancient Age, almost every empire has tried to make foreign military elements fight on its own behalf. These companies, which appear to be commercial enterprises in theory, but are frequently used in intelligence and secret military operations, have become more known and recognized, especially after the invasion of Iraq by the USA in 2003. Private military company personnel composed of military professionals retired or dismissed from the armed forces. Russia has also tried to use private military companies in order to realize her national security and interests. However, some restrictions originating from the constitution and criminal code of the Russian Federation made that solution difficult. The Russian Constitution and the Russian Penal Code does not allow the establishment of mercenary and private military companies and describe such organizations and activities as illegal. Additionally, the Russian military companies, were late for the international security market because of economic problems and the opposition from the armed forces. In this study, the first period of the establishment of the private military company system, the period between 1999 and 2013, is explained in the chronological method.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Private Military Companies
• Russian Volunteer Warriors
• Russian Private Military Companies
• Wagner Group

RUS GÖNÜLLÜ SAVAŞÇILAR VE RUSYA’DA ÖZEL ASKERİ ŞİRKETLERİN ORTAYA ÇIKIŞI

Öz

Antik Çağ’da Mısırlılardan başlayarak, yakın döneme kadar hemen her imparatorluk yabancı askeri unsurları kendi adına savaştırma yoluna gitmiştir. Kâğıt üzerinde ticaret işletmesi olarak gözüken ama sıklıkla istihbarat ve gizli askeri operasyonlarda kullanılan bu şirketler özellikle 2003 yılında Irak’ın ABD tarafından işgali ve sonrasında sıklıkla gündeme geldikleri için daha fazla bilinir ve tanınır hale gelmiştir. Ordudan emekli edilen veya ettirilen profesyonellerden oluşturulan özel askeri şirket personeli düzenli ordu birliklerinin tabi olduğu kurallara bağlı kalmadan çalıştırılmıştır. Ulusal güvenlik ve çıkarlarını gerçekleştirmek için benzer askeri şirketleri Rusya’da kullanmaya çalışmıştır. Ancak bu noktada Rusya Federasyonu Anayasası ve kanunlarından kaynaklanan bazı kısıtlamalar ortaya çıkmıştır. Rus Anayasası ve Rus Ceza Kanunu paralı askerlik ve özel asker şirketlerin kurulmasına izin vermemiş ve bu türden yapılanmaları ve faaliyetleri kanundışı olarak nitelendirmiştir. Gerek bu nokta gerekse de uluslararası güvenlik şirketleri piyasasına gerek ekonomik sorunlar gerekse de silahlı kuvvetlerinden gelen muhalefet sebebiyle geç kalan Rusya Federasyonu şirketleri pazardan Batılı şirketler kadar pay alamamıştır. Bu çalışmada Rusya’nın olaylara doğrudan müdahil olamadığı durumlarda kullanıldığı gönüllü savaşçı uygulaması ve daha sonra Wagner Grup’la özdeşleşen özel askeri şirketler sistemi kurma girişimlerinin ilk dönemi, 1999-2013 yılları arasındaki dönem açıklayıcı ve kronolojik bir yöntemle açıklanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Özel Askeri Şirketler
• Rus Gönüllü Savaşçılar
• Rus Özel Askeri Şirketleri
• Wagner Grup

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