BİLİMİN AMACI: FELSEFİ BİR DEĞERLENDİRME

Yıl 2025, Sayı: 40, 281 - 301, 28.05.2025

Mustafa Efe Ateş

https://doi.org/10.53844/flsf.1589555

Öz

Bilim felsefesi literatüründe çokça tartışılan konulardan biri de bilimin amacıdır. Yaygın görüşe göre bilimin belirli bir amaca sahip olması, onun rasyonel bir etkinlik oluşunu temellendirmektedir. Bu yaygın görüşü benimseyenleri iki ayrı kampta toplamak mümkündür. Bir grup felsefeci bilimin tek bir temel amacı olduğunu savunurken, diğer grup bilimin birden fazla amacı olduğunu ileri sürmektedir. Her iki tarafın görüşlerinin de haklı yönleri olmakla birlikte, bazı noktalarda zayıflıkları da bulunmaktadır. Bu zayıflıklar bir şekilde alternatif bir yaklaşıma ihtiyaç olduğunu göstermektedir. Bu makalede amaç kavramını reddeden, amaçsız bir bilim anlayışını savunan, alternatif bir bakış açısı sunuyorum. Amaçsız bir bilim anlayışını savunurken, genel olarak rasyonaliteden taviz verilmesine gerek olmadığını ileri sürerek, alternatif bir rasyonalite biçiminin bilimsel etkinliğe uygulanabileceğini öneriyorum.

Anahtar Kelimeler

bilimin amacı , amaçsız bilim , rasyonalite , bilim felsefesi

THE AIM OF SCIENCE: A PHILOSOPHICAL EVALUATION

Öz

One widely discussed topic in the philosophy of science literature is the aim of science. The common view holds that science has a particular aim, which justifies it as a rational activity. Those who are committed to this common view can be grouped into two different camps. One camp of philosophers defends the view that science has a single fundamental aim, while the other camp argues that science has multiple aims. Both views have their merits, but they also have weaknesses in certain aspects. The weaknesses in these views, in one way or another, indicate the need for an alternative approach. In this paper, I present an alternative perspective that rejects the notion of aims, advocating for an aimless conception of science. In defending an aimless conception of science, I suggest that an alternative form of rationality can be applied to scientific activity, without compromising rationality in general.

Anahtar Kelimeler

aim of science , aimless science , rationality , philosophy of science

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