21. Yüzyıl için Caydırıcılık: Teori ve Pratikte Neler Değişti?

Yıl 2015, Cilt: 11 Sayı: 22, 31 - 60, 20.10.2015

Hakan Mehmetcik

Öz

Soğuk Savaş yıllarında teorik olarak en fazla gelişmiş ve pratikte en etkin şekilde uygulanmış olan “Caydırıcılık/Nükleer Caydırıcılık”, stratejik düzeyde devletlerin yöneldiği en önemli dış politika araçlarından biri haline gelmiştir. Kendisi iki kutuplu yapı ve karşılıklı nükleer yok oluşa dayanan Soğuk Savaş’ın bir eseri olan caydırıcılık teori ve pratiği, farklı evrelerden geçerek gelişmiş ve çok yoğun bir şekilde çalışılmıştır. Soğuk Savaş’ın sona ermesiyle ise, akademik çalışma konusu olarak çekiciliğini bir süre kaybetmiştir. Fakat gerek 11 Eylül sonrası değişen tehdit algıları, gerekse de Doğu Avrupa, Doğu Asya ve Orta Doğu’da yaşanan son gelişmeler caydırıcılık teori ve pratiğine olan ilgiyi yeniden artırmıştır. Bu çalışmanın amacı, 21. yüzyıl caydırıcılık teori ve pratiğine hâkim olan unsurların analizini sunmaktır. Bu amaçla makalede kavram olarak caydırıcılık, klasik caydırıcılık teorisinin önermeleri ve bunlara getirilen eleştiriler analiz edilerek günümüz caydırıcılık teorisine ve pratiğine egemen olan unsurlar karşılaştırmalı yöntemle incelenecektir. Türkçe literatürde eksikliği duyulan caydırıcılık kavram ve teorisinin bütünsel analizini sunması bakımında makale özgün bir değer içermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Caydırıcılık, Klasik Caydırıcılık Teorisi

Kaynakça

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