Popülist Siyasetin Sosyal Medyada Temsili: İkna Kuramları Çerçevesinde Trump ve Putin’in X Kullanımı Üzerine Bir Analiz

Yıl 2026, Sayı: 72, 43 - 59, 24.03.2026

Birol Demircan

https://doi.org/10.47998/ikad.1765702

https://izlik.org/JA76JS62YF

Öz

Çalışma, popülist siyasetin yükselişi ile sosyal medya kullanımının siyasal iletişimdeki rolünü Trump ve Putin örnekleri üzerinden karşılaştırmalı olarak ele almaktadır. Popülist liderler, toplumu “ahlâklı halk” ve “yoz elitler” olarak ikiye ayıran ince bir ideolojiyi benimser ve bu karşıtlığı sosyal medya sayesinde aracısız biçimde kitlelere aktarabilirler. Bu doğrudan iletişim, geleneksel medya kapısını aşarak hedef kitlenin sosyal medya üzerinden mobilize edilmesine, kapalı gruplar içinde konsolidasyona ve duygusal mesajların yayılmasına yol açar. Çalışma, çerçeveleme ve ikna kuramları çerçevesinde popülist retoriğin olay ve aktörleri basit hikâyelere yerleştirdiğini, “biz–onlar” çatışmasını keskinleştirdiğini ve “düzenbaz elitleri” suçladığını vurgular. Bu araştırma, nitel bir doküman analizi yöntemi kullanarak Donald Trump ve Vladimir Putin’in sosyal medya etkileşimlerini ve söylemlerini incelemektedir. Amerikan Başkanı Donald Trump, kişisel X (Twitter) hesabını yoğun biçimde kullanarak sloganlar, lakaplar ve provokatif mesajlarla gündemi belirlemiş, böylece sosyal medyada yüksek görünürlük sağlamış ve geleneksel medyanın bile tweetlerini haberleştirmesine yol açmıştır. Sürekli tekrarlanan sloganlar, ikili düşünme şemaları ve “millet arkamda” vurgusu, sosyal kanıt ve kıtlık gibi ikna ilkelerini devreye sokarak destekçilerini harekete geçirmiştir. Buna karşılık Vladimir Putin, sosyal medyayı kişisel olarak çok az kullanmış, mesajlarını daha çok devlet kanalları ve resmi ajanslar aracılığıyla iletmeyi tercih etmiştir. Otoriter popülizm kapsamında devlet destekli medya ağları, kamuoyunu şekillendiren tek yönlü içerikler üretmiş, Twitter, devlet politikalarını yüceltmek ve muhalefeti bastırmak amacıyla kullanılmıştır. Sonuç olarak, her iki lider de “biz-onlar” retoriğini sürdürmekte, ancak Trump bireysel ve doğrudan sosyal medya etkisiyle öne çıkarken, Putin dolaylı ve devlet aracılı bir medya stratejisi benimsemektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Popülizm , İletişim , Sosyal Medya , Liderler , İkna Kuramları

Etik Beyan

Çalışma muhtevası, yöntemi bakımından etik kurul onayı gerektirmeyen türden bir çalışmadır.

The Representation of Populist Politics on Social Media: An Analysis of Trump and Putin’s Use of X within the Framework of Persuasion Theories

https://izlik.org/JA76JS62YF

Öz

The study examines the rise of populist politics and the role of social media in political communication through a comparative analysis of the cases of Trump and Putin. Populist leaders adopt a thin ideology that divides society into “virtuous people” and “corrupt elites,” and can convey this antagonism directly to the masses through social media. This direct communication bypasses the gatekeeping of traditional media, enabling the mobilization of target audiences via social media, fostering consolidation within closed groups, and facilitating the spread of emotional messages. Within the framework of framing and persuasion theories, the study emphasizes that populist rhetoric situates events and actors in simplified narratives, sharpens the “us-them” conflict, and blames the “dishonest elites”. This study examines the social media interactions and discourses of Donald Trump and Vladimir Putin using a qualitative document analysis. U.S. President Donald Trump made intensive use of his personal X (Twitter) account to set the agenda with slogans, nicknames, and provocative messages, thereby gaining high visibility on social media and prompting even traditional media outlets to report on his tweets. Repeated slogans, binary thinking patterns, and the emphasis on “the people are behind me” activated persuasion principles such as social proof and scarcity, mobilizing his supporters. In contrast, Vladimir Putin used social media personally only to a very limited extent, preferring to deliver his messages through state channels and official agencies. Within the scope of authoritarian populism, state-supported media networks produced one-way content that shaped public opinion; X was employed as a tool to glorify state policies and suppress the opposition. In conclusion, both leaders maintain the “us-them” rhetoric; however, while Trump stands out with his individual and direct social media influence, Putin adopts an indirect, state-mediated media strategy.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Populism , Communication , Social Media , Leaders , Persuasion Theories

Kaynakça

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