İsrail Neden İran’a Saldırdı: Kolay Zafer Yanılgısı

Yıl 2025, Cilt: 9 Sayı: 2, 561 - 583, 29.12.2025

Furkan Polat

https://doi.org/10.33201/iranian.1771995

Öz

7 Ekim olaylarının ardından İsrail, komşu ülkeleri de kapsayan geniş bir bölgede saldırgan davranışlar sergilemeye başladı. Bu politikanın bir davamı olarak, Tahran’ın nükleer programına ve Ayetullah rejiminin varlığına son vermeyi amaçlayan İsrail, 13 Haziran’da İran’a saldırdı. Bölgesel istikrarı baltalayan bu davranışları doğal olarak İsrail neden saldırgan bir politika izliyor sorusunu ortaya çıkarıyor. Bu soruyu İsrail-İran savaşı özelinde cevaplayan bu çalışma, İsrailli karar alıcıların rakipleriyle mücadelelerinde kolay zafer elde edeceklerine dair beklentilerinin saldırgan davranışlara sebep olduğunu iddia ediyor. Askeri güç dengesi, irade dengesi ve müttefiklerinin nispi gücü ve bağlılığına dair hesaplamalarda yapılan iyimser hatalar başta İran olmak üzere bölgedeki diğer ülkelere yönelik saldırganlığı tetikleyen temel faktörlerdir. Karar alıcıların bu faktörler açısından İsrail’in rakiplerine nazaran avantajlı olduğunu düşünmeleri savaşları kazanacaklarına dair beklentilerini körüklüyor. Dolayısıyla bölgede istikrarsızlığı derinleştiren bu davranışların son bulması ve savaş olasılığının azalması için diğer aktörlerin etkin bir caydırıcılık ortaya koyması gerekiyor.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Ortadoğu , İsrail-İran Savaşı , Hatalı İyimserlik , Caydırıcılık

Etik Beyan

Bu makale etik kurul kararından muaftır. Çalışmada katılımcı bulunmamaktadır. Çalışma için herhangi bir kurum veya projeden mali destek alınmamıştır. Çalışmada kişiler ve kurumlar arası çıkar çatışması bulunmamaktadır. Telif hakkına sebep olacak bir materyal kullanılmamıştır.

Destekleyen Kurum

yok

Teşekkür

yok

Why Israel Attacked Iran: The Illusion of Easy Victory

Öz

Following the attacks on 7 October, Israel began to engage in aggressive behaviour across a broad region, including neighbouring countries. As a manifestation of this policy, Israel, which aims to destroy Tehran’s nuclear programme and overthrow the Ayatollah regime, attacked Iran on 13 June. These behaviours, which undermine regional stability, naturally raise the question of why Israel is pursuing an aggressive policy. This study, which answers this question specifically in relation to the Israel-Iran war, argues that Israeli decision-makers’ expectations of easy victory in their struggle against their rivals lead to aggressive behaviour. Optimistic miscalculations regarding military balance of power, balance of will, and the relative strength and commitment of allies are pivotal factors triggering aggression against Iran and other countries in the region. The perception among decision-makers that Israel possesses an advantage over its geopolitical rivals in terms of these factors serves to engender expectations of victory in armed conflicts. Therefore, in order to put an end to these actions that are deepening instability in the region and reduce the likelihood of war, other actors need to demonstrate effective deterrence.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Middle East , Israel-Iran War , False Optimism , Deterrence

Etik Beyan

The article is exempt from the Ethics Committe Decision. There are no participants. The author received no financial support from any institution and there’s no conflict of interest. No material subject to copyright is included.

Destekleyen Kurum

no

Teşekkür

no

Kaynakça

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