Capacity Choice in a Price-Setting Mixed Oligopoly under Demand Uncertainty
Öz
We study a mixed oligopoly market in which firms choose the capacities and prices sequentially in an uncertain environment with differentiated products. If the products of the firms are substitutable and realized demand is higher (lower) than expected demand, we find that both firms hold under (excess) capacity. In the case of medium realized demand, private firm choses under capacity but public firm holds excess capacity. If the products are complements and realized demand is high (low) enough, both firms hold under (excess) capacity. Whenever realized demand is conformable with expectations, private and public firms hold under capacity.
Anahtar Kelimeler
Kaynakça
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Ayrıntılar
Birincil Dil
İngilizce
Konular
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Bölüm
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Yayımlanma Tarihi
13 Ağustos 2015
Gönderilme Tarihi
13 Ağustos 2015
Kabul Tarihi
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Yayımlandığı Sayı
Yıl 2014 Cilt: 2 Sayı: 2