The Agent-Centered Interpretation of Knowledge in Virtue Epistemology

Öz

This article examines virtue epistemology—an increasingly prominent approach in contemporary epistemology —through the lens of an agent centered interpretation of knowledge. The crisis surrounding the definition of knowledge, initiated by Edmund Gettier’s critique of the “justified true belief” (JTB) model, deepened the debates between internalism and externalism, demonstrating that knowledge must be reconsidered not only in terms of truth and justification but also in relation to the epistemic agent’s character and intellectual responsibility. Within this framework, the study focuses on three central approaches of virtue epistemology. Ernest Sosa’s aptness based model distinguishes the value of knowledge from mere accidental truth by grounding it in the agent’s cognitive competences. John Greco’s agent reliabilism, in turn, argues that these competences should not be understood merely as reliable processes but as capacities internal to the epistemic agent’s character. Linda Zagzebski defines intellectual virtues as traits of character integrated with steadfast motivations directed toward truth; in doing so, she situates knowledge at the intersection of cognitive achievement and ethical responsibility. By comparing these three approaches, the article highlights the unique contribution of virtue epistemology to our understanding of the nature of knowledge. From this perspective, knowledge cannot be defined solely by objective truth; rather, the agent’s autonomy, intellectual character, and disposition to seek the truth must also be considered among its conditions. Consequently, virtue epistemology does not treat the problem of knowledge merely at a theoretical level but also calls for its reconsideration in pedagogical and ethical dimensions. In this respect, the study aims to contribute to contemporary epistemology by articulating an agent centered interpretation of knowledge.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Virtue epistemology
• intellectual virtue
• intellectual agent
• epistemic character
• Gettier problem

Erdem Epistemolojisinde Bilginin Fail Merkezli Yorumu

Öz

Bu makale, çağdaş epistemolojide giderek daha fazla önem kazanan erdem epistemolojisini bilginin fail merkezli yorumu çerçevesinde ele almaktadır. Edmund Gettier’in “gerekçelendirilmiş doğru inanç” (justified true belief – JTB) modeline yönelttiği eleştirilerle başlayan bilgi tanımı krizi, içselcilik (internalism) ve dışsalcılık (externalism) tartışmalarını derinleştirmiş; bilginin yalnızca doğruluk ve gerekçelendirme ölçütleriyle değil, aynı zamanda epistemik failin karakteri ve entelektüel sorumluluğu bağlamında düşünülmesi gerektiğini göstermiştir. Bu bağlamda çalışma, erdem epistemolojisinin üç temel yaklaşımına odaklanmaktadır. Ernest Sosa’nın uygunluk (aptness) merkezli modeli, bilginin değerini rastlantısal doğruluktan ayırarak öznenin bilişsel yetkinliklerine dayandırır. John Greco’nun fail güvenirliği (agent reliabilism) kuramı, bu yetkinliklerin yalnızca güvenilir süreçler olarak değil, failin epistemik karakterine içkin kapasiteler olarak anlaşılması gerektiğini ileri sürer. Linda Zagzebski ise entelektüel erdemleri, doğruya yönelmiş kararlı motivasyonlarla bütünleşmiş ahlaki ve bilişsel karakter nitelikleri olarak tanımlar; böylece bilgi, bilişsel başarı ile etik sorumluluğun kesişiminde konumlandırılır. Makale, bu üç yaklaşımı karşılaştırarak erdem epistemolojisinin bilginin doğasına getirdiği özgün katkıyı ortaya koymaktadır. Buna göre bilgi, yalnızca nesnel doğrulukla tanımlanamaz; epistemik failin özerkliği, entelektüel karakteri ve doğruyu isteme yönelimi de bilginin koşulları arasında yer alır. Dolayısıyla erdem epistemolojisi, bilgi sorununu yalnızca teorik düzlemde değil; aynı zamanda pedagojik ve etik boyutlarıyla da yeniden düşünmeye çağıran bütüncül bir kuramsal zemin sunmaktadır. Bu yönüyle çalışma, bilginin fail merkezli bir yorumu üzerinden çağdaş epistemolojiye özgün bir katkı sağlamayı amaçlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Erdem epistemolojisi
• entelektüel erdem
• entelektüel fail
• epistemik karakter
• Gettier problemi

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