Zihin Felsefesinde Fizikselin Tanımı Sorunu

Öz

Zihin-beden sorununun birçok felsefeci tarafından zihinselle fizikselin ontolojik ilişkisini açıklığa kavuşturma sorunu olarak ele alınması, günümüz zihin felsefesi tartışmaları için “fiziksel” teriminin tanımlanması ihtiyacını doğuruyor. Fakat, zihnin fizikselliğini sorgulanma motivasyonun altında zihnin doğasına ve doğadaki yerine dair farklı sorular yatabiliyor ve bu soruları “fiziksel” terimini kullanarak sormak istediğimizde, birbiriyle uyuşmayan, bazen de kendi içinde kabul edilebilir olmayan, farklı fiziksellik tanımlamalarını kullanmamız gerekiyor. Bu çalışmada, zihin felsefesi tartışmalarında en çok kullanılan dört fiziksellik tanımlamasını inceleyerek bu tanımlamalardaki sorunları ortaya koyuyor ve sonuç olarak, günümüz zihin felsefesinde “fiziksel” terimi diyaloğu ve anlaşmayı zorlaştıran bir rol oynamaya başladığından, zihin-beden sorunu bağlamında bu terimi kullanmaktan kaçınmanın daha yararlı olacağı görüşünü savunuyorum.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Fiziksel
• Fizikselcilik
• Fizik
• İkicilik
• Bilinç

The Problem of the Definition of Physical in Philosophy of Mind

Öz

Since, in contemporary philosophy of mind, the mind-body problem is generally understood as the problem of explaining the ontological relation between the mental and the physical, defining “physical” presents itself as an important issue. However, the question of the physicality of the mental can stem from several distinct underlying questions and if we want to phrase those underlying questions by using the term “physical”, we are left with incompatible and, to different extents, implausible conceptualizations of the physical. In this paper, I investigate four of the most influential conceptualizations of the physical in the contemporary philosophy of mind, and I conclude that the term “physical” is best left out from the debate on the mind-body problem.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Physical
• Physicalism
• Physics
• Dualism
• Consciousness

Kaynakça

1. ARMSTRONG, David M. (1970). “The Nature of Mind.” The Mind/Brain Identity Theory, ed. Clive V. Borst, Macmillan.
2. ARMSTRONG, David M. (1993). “A World of States of Affairs.” Philosophical Perspectives. Vol. 7, Language and Logic, pp. 429-440
3. BOHR, Niels (1934). Atomic Theory and the Description of Nature. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press. (Re-issued in 1961)
4. BOHR, Niels (1958). Atomic Physics and Human Knowledge. New York: Wiley.
5. BOKULICH, Peter (2011). “Hempel’s Dilemma and Domains of Physics.” Analysis, 71(4)/2011: 646-651.
6. CHALMERS, David J. (2011). “Verbal Disputes.” Philosophical Review, 120(4)/2011: 515-566.
7. CHALMERS, D. J. & F. JACKSON (2001). “Conceptual analysis and Reductive Explanation,” Philosophical Review, 110/2011: 315-360.
8. CHOMSKY, N. (1995). “Language and Nature,” Mind, 104/1995: 1-61.

9. CORNMAN, J. (1971). Materialism and Sensations, New Haven: Yale University Press.
10. CRANE, Tim & D. H. MELLOR (1990). “There Is No Question of Physicalism,” Mind, 99(394)/1990: 185-206.
11. DALY, Chris (1998). “What are Physical Properties?”, Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 79(3)/1990: 196-217.
12. DERKSEN, A. A. (1993). “The Seven Sins of Pseudoscience,” Journal for General Philosophy of Science, 24/1993: 17–42.
13. GOLDSTEIN, S. (2017) “Bohmian Mechanics”, The Stanford Encyclopedia of Philosophy (Summer 2017 Edition), Edward N. Zalta (ed.).
14. GOCKE, Benedikt Paul (2009) “What Is Physicalism?”, Ratio, 22(3)/2009: 291-307.
15. HEISENBERG, Werner (1958). “The Representation of Nature in Contemporary Physics,” Daedalus, 87/1958: 95-108
16. HOWELL, Robert J. (2008). “Subjective Physicalism,” The Case for Qualia. ed. Edmond Wright, MIT Press.
17. JACKSON, Frank (1982). “Epiphenomenal Qualia,” The Philosophical Quarterly, 32(127)/1982: 127–136. doi:10.2307/2960077.
18. JACKSON, Frank (1986). “What Mary Didn’t Know,” The Journal of Philosophy, 83(5)/1986: 291-295. doi:10.2307/2026143.
19. JACKSON, Frank. (2000). From Metaphysics to Ethics: A Defense of Conceptual Analysis, Oxford University Press.
20. KIYMAZ, Tufan (2019a) “Phenomenal Concepts and Physical Facts: A Dialogue with Mary,” Filozofia: Journal for Philosophy, 74(10)/2019: 797-807.
21. KIYMAZ, Tufan (2019b) “Subjective Physicalism as a Response to the Knowledge Argument,” MetaZihin. 2(2)/2019: 199-211.
22. KIYMAZ, Tufan (2020) “A Priori Physicalism and the Knowledge Argument,” Teorema, 39(2)/2020: 87-103.
23. KIYMAZ, Tufan (Yayınlanacak) “On the Paradigmatic Conception of the Physical,” Problemos.
24. LEVINE, Joseph (1983). “Materialism and qualia: The Explanatory Gap,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly, 64/1983: 354-361.
25. LOEWER, Barry M. (2001). “From Physics to Physicalism,” Physicalism and its Discontents, ed. Carl Gillett & Barry M. Loewer, Cambridge University Press.
26. MELNYK, Andrew (1997). “How to Keep the 'Physical' in Physicalism,” The Journal of Philosophy, 94 (12): 1997: 622-637.
27. MONTERO, Barbara (1999). “The Body Problem,” Nous, 33/1999: 183–200.
28. NAGEL, Thomas (1974). “What is it like to be a bat?” Philosophical Review, 83/1974: 435-50.
29. POLAND, Jeffrey (2003). “Chomsky's Challenge to Physicalism,” Chomsky and His Critics, pp. 29-48, ed. Louise M. Antony, Malden Ma: Blackwell.
30. SMART, J. J. C. (1978). “The Content of Physicalism,” Philosophical Quarterly, 28/1978: 339-41.
31. SMITH, A. D. (1993). “Non-reductive Physicalism?,” Objections to Physicalism, ed. H. Robinson. Oxford: Clarendon Press.
32. SNOWDON, Paul (1989) “On Formulating Materialism and Dualism”, Cause, Mind, and Reality: Essays in Honour of C.B.Martin, pp. 137–158, ed. John Heil, Dordrecht: Kluwer Press.
33. SPURRETT, D. & D. PAPINEAU (1999). “A note on the Completeness of 'Physics'”, Analysis, 59(1)/1999: 25-29.
34. STAPP, Henry (2007). “Quantum Mechanical Theories of Consciousness.” A Companion to Consciousness, pp. 300-312, ed. Max Velmans & Susan Schneider, Blackwell.
35. STOLJAR, Daniel (2001). “Two Conceptions of the Physical,” Philosophy and Phenomenological Research, 62(2)/2001: 253-281.
36. STRAWSON, Galen (2006). “Realistic Monism: Why Physicalism Entails Panpsychism,” Journal of Consciousness Studies, 13(10-11)/2006: 3-31.
37. TYE, Michael (2009). Consciousness Revisited: Materialism Without Phenomenal Concepts. MIT Press.
38. WILSON, Jessica M. (2006).“On Characterizing the Physical,” Philosophical Studies, 131(1)/2006: 61-99.
39. VON NEUMANN, J. (1955). Mathematical Foundations of Quantum Mechanics. Princeton.