Can Animals Think?

Yıl 2025, Cilt: 24 Sayı: 1, 43 - 77, 28.03.2025

Nazım Gökel , Simay İkier

Öz

Can Animals Think?

Abstract: While not as much as humans, many believe that animals have at least a limited capacity for thought. According to Dennett, it is very problematic to assert that animals are capable of thinking. Intelligent animal behaviors can be described as instances of unthinking intentionality. Sometimes people act without thinking, but unlike animals, humans go through a prolonged and conscious learning process before those automatic behaviors become established. Dennett, having developed his ideas opposing animal thinking, confesses that he aimed to disturb some of the deeply rooted views supporting animal thinking (Dennett 1996). Still, Dennett's chosen examples and developed arguments present unexpected issues when trying to establish a reasonable doubt. The examples primarily focus on procedural memory processes, yet, to cast doubt about whether animals think, the focus should be on episodic memory processes, not procedural memory processes. Furthermore, not all procedural memory processes, contrary to Dennett's view, require conscious process of learning beforehand in humans. In summary, the skepticism regarding animal thinking may still be warranted, not because of Dennett’s reasons and examples Dennett favors most, but for other reasons.


Keywords: Consciousness, Thought, Representation, Episodic Memory, Dennett.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Consciousness, Thought, Representation, Episodic Memory, Dennett

Hayvanlar Düşünebilir Mi?

Öz

Hayvanlar Düşünebilir Mi?

Öz: Birçok kişi, hayvanların insanlar kadar olmasa da en azından sınırlı bir düşünce yetisine sahip olduğuna inanır. Dennett’e göre ise, hayvanların düşünebildiğini söylemek oldukça zordur. Zeki hayvan davranışları düşünmeyen yönelimsellik örnekleri olarak betimlenebilir. Bazen insanlar da düşünmeden eyleme geçer; yalnız, hayvanlardan farklı olarak insanlar bu otomatikleşmiş davranışların yerleşmesinden önce uzun ve bilinçli bir öğrenme sürecinden geçerler. Dennett, hayvan düşüncesi karşıtı fikirlerini geliştirdikten sonra hayvan düşüncesini destekleyen köklü fikirleri rahatsız etmek için bu fikirleri geliştirdiğini itiraf eder (Dennett 1996). Yalnız, Dennett’in seçtiği örnekler ve geliştirdiği argümanlar makul bir şüpheyi yerleştirmeye çalışırken beklenmedik sorunlar çıkarır. Örnekler ağırlıklı olarak işlemsel bellek süreçleriyle ilgili örneklerdir; halbuki hayvanların düşünüp düşünemediği ile ilgili bir şüphe yaratmak için bakılması gereken süreçler işlemsel bellek süreçleri değil, olaysal bellek süreçleridir. Ayrıca, Dennett’in iddiasının aksine, insanlarda da her işlemsel bellek sürecinin öncesinde bilinçli bir öğrenme süreci gerekmemektedir. Özetle, hayvanların düşünmesi konusundaki şüphecilik hala haklı olabilir, ancak bu Dennett’in öne sürdüğü nedenler ve en çok tercih ettiği örnekler yüzünden değil, başka nedenlerden dolayıdır.

Anahtar Kelimeler: Bilinç, Düşünce, Temsil, Olaysal Bellek, Dennett.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Bilinç, Düşünce, Temsil, Olaysal Bellek, Dennett

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