SECURITY STRATEGY OF SAUDI ARABIA AS A REGIONAL POWER IN THE UNIPOLAR SYSTEM (2010-2020)

Öz

When the security policies of Saudi Arabia between 2000-2010 and 2010-2020 are examined, it can be seen that although there is no change in the internal threats to the Saudi Arabian Regime, there has been a change and transformation in its external threats. Therefore, although the internal threats are the same, in the alliance relations it has formed to balance the internal threats with the interrelated external threats, the interrelated external threats and the main threat have changed. In this case, it shows us that state behavior and alliance relations are constantly re-established as instant security measures. Threats, which are also seen as the dynamic structure of the international system, and the change in alliance relations necessitate a multifaceted approach for regional powers. This is also due to the features of Saudi Arabia such as the monarchical state structure, the competing allegiencies of the people, and the fact that it is a rentier state. For societies where the security of the regime is more important and prioritized than the security of the state due to internal threats, it should have multi-layered factors to ensure their security, because of their local characteristics. For Saudi Arabia, these factors consist of internal threats, an external threat interrelated with an internal threat, and regional and global threats. This situation gives rise to the omni-balancing strategy, which means that Saudi Arabia forms alliances with foreign powers interrelated to its internal threats and balances internal and external threats with each other. In cases where omni-balancing is not possible, various reforms, social assistance and cooperation initiatives come into play.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Saudi Arabia
• regional power
• security strategy
• omni-balacing strategy
• internal and external theats

TEK KUTUPLU SİSTEMDE BİR BÖLGESEL GÜÇ OLARAK SUUDİ ARABİSTAN’IN GÜVENLİK POLİTİKASI (2010-2020)

Öz

Suudi Arabistan’ın 2000-2010 yılları ve 2010-2020 yılları arasındaki güvenlik politikaları incelendiğinde Suudi Arabistan’ın Rejim’inin güvenliği noktasında iç tehditlerinde herhangi bir değişiklik olmamasına rağmen dış tehditlerinde değişim ve dönüşüm yaşandığı görülmektedir. Dolayısıyla iç tehditleri ilişkili dış tehditle dengelemek için sergilediği ittifak ilişkilerinde iç tehditleri aynı olmasına rağmen ilişkili dış tehditler ve ana tehdit değişikliğe uğramıştır. Bu durumda bize devlet davranışlarının ve ittifak ilişkilerinin anlık güvenlik tedbirleri olarak sürekli yeniden kurulduğunu göstermektedir. Uluslararası sistemin dinamik yapısı olarak da görülen tehditler ve ittifak ilişkilerindeki değişim bölgesel güçler için çok yönlü bir yaklaşımı gerekli kılmaktadır. Bu durum Suudi Arabistan’ın devlet yapısının monarşik olması, halkın devlet dışında rakip bağlılıklara sahip oluşu ve ekonomik özelliklerinin rantiyer devlet oluşu gibi özelliklerinden de kaynaklanmaktadır. İç tehditlerle rejimin güvenliğinin devletin güvenliğinden daha önemli ve öncelikli görüldüğü toplumlar için yerel özelliklerinin de buna müsait oluşundan dolayı güvenliklerini sağlamak için çok katmanlı etkenlere sahip olması gerekmektedir. Suudi Arabistan için bu etkenler iç tehditlerden, iç tehditle ilişkili bir dış tehditten, bölgesel ve küresel tehditlerden oluşmaktadır. Bu durumda Suudi Arabistan’ın iç tehditleri ile ilişkili dış güçlerle ittifak yapmasına, iç ve dış tehdidi birbiriyle dengelemesini ifade eden çift dengeleme stratejisini doğurmaktadır. Çift dengelemenin mümkün olmadığı durumlarda da çeşitli reformlar, sosyal yardımlar ve iş birliği girişimleri devreye girmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Suudi Arabistan
• bölgesel güç
• güvenlik stratejisi
• çift dengeleme stratejisi
• iç ve dış tehditler

ПОЛИТИКА БЕЗОПАСНОСТИ САУДОВСКОЙ АРАВИИ КАК РЕГИОНАЛЬНОЙ ДЕРЖАВЫ В ОДНОПОЛЯРНОЙ СИСТЕМЕ (2010-2020)

Öz

Если проанализировать политику безопасности Саудовской Аравии в период с 2000 по 2010 годы и с 2010 по 2020 годы, можно увидеть, что, хотя нет никаких изменений во внутренних угрозах, касающихся безопасности саудовского режима, произошли изменения и трансформация его внешних угроз. Таким образом, при союзнических отношениях для уравновешивания внешней угрозы Саудовская Аравии установливая альянсы, пытается сбалансировать внутренние угрозы с соответствующей внешней угрозой, Это показывает, что поведение государства и союзнические отношения постоянно устанавливаются как мгновенные меры безопасности. Угрозы и изменения в союзнических отношениях, которые также рассматриваются как динамическая структура международной системы, требуют многогранного подхода со стороны региональных держав. Поскольку как Саудовской Аравия является государством-рантье, такая ситуация также обусловлена исходя из разных характеристик, таких как её монархическая государственная структура и общество, имеющие конкурирующую лояльность за пределами государства, а также её экономическое положение. Общество, где внутренние угрозы и безопасность режима считаются более важными и приоритетными, чем безопасность государства, должны иметь многоуровневые факторы обеспечения своей безопасности, поскольку местные особенности являются подходящими для этого. Для Саудовской Аравии эти факторы исходят из внутренних угроз, связанные с внешней и региональными и глобальными угрозами. В тех случаях, когда двойное балансирование невозможно, в игру вступают различные инициативы по реформированию, социальной помощи и сотрудничества.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Саудовская Аравия
• региональная держава
• стратегия безопасности
• стратегия двойного балансирования
• внутренние и внешние угрозы

Kaynakça

1. Acar, N. (2018). “Arap Baharı Sürecinde Ortadoğu’da Güvenlik ve Dış Politika: Suudi Arabistan Örneği”, Birey ve Toplum, Autumn, 8, (16), 139-171.
2. Akdoğan, İ. (2012) “Arap Baharı’nın İran-Suudi Arabistan İlişkileri Üzerindeki Etkisi” Ortadoğu Yıllığı, 463-482.
3. al-Haqbani, N. (2013). “Riyadh Confirms Spy Cell Worked for Iranian Intelligence Services” (Arabic), al-Hayat, 27 March.
4. Aljazeera, (2011b). “Saudi scholars forbid protest calls”, Al Jazeera, News Agencıes, 10 March, (Online) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/3/10/saudi-scholars-forbid-protest-calls, 07 October 2020.
5. Aljazeera. (2011a). “Saudi Arabia bans protest rallies”, Al Jazeera, News Agencıes, 10 March, (Online) https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2011/03/10/saudi-arabia-bans-protest-rallies/, 07 October 2020.
6. Almela, M. F. H. & Maider Mayor Mayoz, M. M. (2016). “How did Saudi Arabia’s defence policy change after the Arab Spring?”, Research Gate, August, 1-12.
7. Amos, D. (2012). “Saudi Aid Boost to Syrian Rebels Puts Jordan At Risk”, National Public Radio, 16 March, (Online) https://www.npr.org/2014/03/16/290609402/saudi-aid-boost-to-syrian-rebels-puts-jordan-at-risk, 15 October 2020.
8. Arabian Business. (2011). “Saudi Arabian Authorities Release Arrested Shiite Cleric”, 7 March, (Online) https://www.arabianbusiness.com/saudi-arabian-authorities-release-arrested-shiite-cleric-385256.html, 15 September 2020.

9. Aras, B. & Falk, R. (2015). “Authoritarian ‘geopolitics’ of survival in the Arab Spring,” Third World Quarterly, 36.
10. Ataman, M. & Demir, G. N. (2011). “Suudi Arabistan 2011”, Ortadoğu Yıllığı, 183-212.
11. Aydin, A. (2016). “Changing Dynamics In The Middle East after the Arab Awakening; The Position of Turkish Foreign Policy”, https://doi.org/10.20472/iac.2016.022.008
12. Blackwill, R. D. &. O’ Sullivan, M. L. (2011). “America’s Energy Edge”, Foreign Affairs, 93, 2014, p. 1-2.
13. Bozarslan, H. (2011). Ortadoğu: Bir Şiddet Tarihi: Osmanlı İmparatorluğu’nun Sonundan El Kaide’ye, İstanbul, İletişim Yayınları.
14. Cerioli, L. (2023). “Saudi Arabian Strategy Reassessment Since 2003: The Emergence of a Regional Leadership Via Neoclassical Realist Lenses”, International Area Studies Review, 26(3), 287-303. https://doi.org/10.1177/22338659231180059
15. Chriss Street, (2019). “Saudi Arabia’s $200 million a day fails to conquer Yemen”, American Thinker, 15 August, (Online) https://www.americanthinker.com/blog/2019/08/saudi_arabias_200_million_a_day_fails_to_conquer_yem en_.html, 20 September 2020.
16. Clinton, H. (2011). “America’s Pasific Century”, Foreign Policy, 11 October, 56-63.
17. Colombo, S. (2012). “The GCC and the Arab Spring: A Tale of Double Standards,” The International Spectator: Italian Journal of International Affairs,” 47, 113-123.
18. Darwich, M. (2018). The Saudi Intervention in Yemen, Turkey Inisight, 20, (2), May/August, 125-142.
19. Doost, H. K. (2021). “Grand Strategies Decide Fate of Middle East”, Daily Sabah, 12 May.
20. Dünya Bülteni. (2011) “Suudi Arabistan’da da sanal isyan başladı”, 3 March, (Online) https://www.dunyabulteni.net/ortadogu/suudi-arabistanda-da-sanal-isyan-basladi-h149719.html, 19 October 2020.
21. Echaque, A. (2014). “Emboldened yet vulnerable: The changing foreign policies of Qatar and Saudi Arabia”, FRİDE Working Paper.
22. Ehteshami, A. (2018). “Saudi Arabia as a Resurgent Regional Power”. The International Spectator, 53(4), 75-94. https://doi.org/10.1080/03932729.2018.1507722
23. Ekşi, M. (2017). “Regional Hegemony Quests in The Middle East from The Balance of Power System to the Balance of Proxy Wars: Turkey as Balancing Power for the Iran - Saudi Rivalry”, Gazi Akademik Bakış, 133-156. https://doi.org/10.19060/gav.379597
24. Fisk, R. (2011). “Saudis mobilise thousands of troops to quell growing revolt”, Independent, 5 March, (Online) https://www.independent.co.uk/news/world/middle-east/saudis-mobilise-thousands-of-troops-to-quell- growing-revolt-2232928.html, 07 October 2020.
25. Gallarotti, G. & Al-Filali, I. (2012). “Saudi Arabia’s Soft Power.” International Studies, 49(3-4), 233-261. https://doi.org/10.1177/0020881714532707
26. Gause, F. G. (2014). “Saudi Arabia in the New Middle East”, Council on Foreign Relations, (63), 1-45.
27. Gavin, J. (2011). “Riyadh Spends to Curb Unrest”, Middle East Economic Digest, 15–21 April, 30.
28. Heydemann S. & Leenders, R. (2011) “Authoritarian Resilience: Regime Responses to the Arab Awakening”, Globalizations, 8, (5).
29. Hoffman, F. G. (2016). “U.S. Defense Policy and Strategy”, R.D. Hooker, Jr., Charting A Course: Strategic Choices for a New Administration, 12 December, 37-59.
30. Huafei, Q. I. U. (2013). “Sino-us Strategic Dilemma From the Perspective of Power Transition in Asia-Pasific and Middle East”, Journal of Middle Eastern and Islamic Studies (in Asia), 7, 57-96.
31. Human Right Watch. (2011). “Saudi Arabia: Free Political Activists”, 19 February, (Online) https://www.hrw.org/news/2011/02/19/saudi-arabia-free-political-activists, 06 October 2020.
32. Iran Press, (2019). “Annual cost of Yemen war for Saudi Arabia is $ 60 bln: al-Houthi”, 17 December, (Online) https://iranpress.com/content/16656, 20 September 2020.
33. Karaağaçlı, A. (2011). “Bahreyn Krizi Ekseninde Suudi Arabistan-İran Çatışması”, BİLGESAM, 29 April.
34. Khatib, L. & Lust E. (ed.). (2014). Taking to the Streets: The Transformation of Arab Activism, Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, 317-318.
35. Kural, M., & Erdem, G. (2023). “Saudi Arabia’s Foreign Policy Towards Turkey during and after Arab Uprising: A Defensive Realism Approach”, Przegląd Strategiczny, (15), 59-69. https://doi.org/10.14746/ps.2022.1.4
36. Matthiesen, T. (2009). “The Shi’a of Saudi Arabia at a Crossroads”, Middle East Report Online, 5 June, (Online) https://merip.org/2009/05/the-shia-of-saudi-arabia-at-a-crossroads/, 15 September 2020.
37. Matthiesen, T. (2012). “A ‘Saudi Spring?’: The Shi’a Protest Movement in the Eastern Province 2011–2012”, Middle East Journal, 66, (4), 628–659.
38. Moghadam, V. M. (2017). “Explaining divergent outcomes of the Arab Spring: the significance of gender and women’s mobilizations”, Politics, Groups, and Identities, Northeastern University, 6 February.
39. Nolte, D. (2010). “How to Compare Regional Powers: Analytical Concepts and Research Topics”, Review of International Studies, 36(04), 881-901. https://doi.org/10.1017/s026021051000135x
40. Oktav, Ö. Z. (2019). “Suriye Krizi Sürecinde Suudi Arabistan’ın Değişen Stratejileri ve Arap Dünyasında Değişen Dengeler”, Researchgate, 1-21.
41. Pasha, A. (2016). “Saudi Arabia and the Iranian Nuclear Deal”, Contemporary Review of the Middle East, 3(4), 387-404. https://doi.org/10.1177/2347798916664613
42. Patrick, N. (2011). “The GCC: Gulf state integration or leadership cooperation?”, The London School of Economics and Political Science, London.
43. REUTERS. (2011). “Gulf states launch $20 billion fund for Oman and Bahrain, Ulf Laessing ve Cynthian, 10 March, (Online) https://www.reuters.com/article/us-gulf-fund-idUSTRE7294B120110310, 20 September 2020.
44. Richter, T. (2020). “New Petro‐Aggression in the Middle East: Saudi Arabia in the Spotlight”, Global Policy, 11(1), 93- 102. https://doi.org/10.1111/1758-5899.12780
45. Sınmaz, K. (2019). “Mısır Raporu: Devrim ve Darbe Sarmalında Bir Toplum”, İNSAMER, 27 May.
46. Siber Bülten, (2019). “Saudi Aramco’yu vuran İran’ı caydırmak için siber saldırı seçeneği masada: Stuxnet 2.0 mı geliyor?”, 2 October, (Online) https://siberbulten.com/uluslararasi-iliskiler/saudi-aramcoyu-vuran-irani- caydirmak-icin-siber-saldiri-secenegi-masada-stuxnet-2-0-mi-geliyor/, 10 September 2020.
47. Steinberg, G. (2011). The Wahhabiya and Shi’ism, from 1744/45 to 2008, in The Sunna and Shi’a in History: Division and Ecumenism in History, New York, Palgrave Macmillan, 163–182.
48. Steinberg, G. (2014). “Leading the Counter-Revolution Saudi Arabia and the Arab Spring”, SWP Research Paper, Berlin, June.
49. Telci, İ. N., Mehmet Rakipoğlu, M. (2018). “Suudi Arabistan’ın Müslüman Kardeşler Politikası: 1932- 2016”, Akademik İncelemeler Dergisi, Volume: 13, Issue: 1, April, 137-168.
50. The Guardian. (2018) “Donald Trump says US will no longer abide by Iran deal – as it happened”, 8 May, (Çevirim içi) https://www.theguardian.com/world/live/2018/may/08/iran-nuclear-deal-donald-trump-latest- live-updates, 12 January 2022.
51. The Straits Times. (2018). “US won’t be world’s ‘policeman’, Trump says during surprise visit to Iraq”, 27 December, (Online) https://www.straitstimes.com/world/united-states/in-a-first-trump-makes-surprise-visit- to-us-troops-in-iraq, 12 January 2022.
52. Torabi, G. (2012). “Arab Revolutions and Iran’s Security”, Discourse: An Iranian Quartely, 10 (1-2), 97-117.
53. Valz, B. (2016). “An inevitable Rivalry? A Re-evalvation of Suudi-Iranian relations”, MA degree in Geopolitics, Territory and Security at King’s College, London.
54. Westphal, K., Everhaus, M. & Steinberg, G. (2014). “The Us shale revolution and the Arab Gulf States: the economic and political impact of changing energy markets”, SWP Research Paper, (33), 1-34.
55. Ya’alon, M. (2017). “United State Policy in the Middle East: The Need for a Grand Strategy”, The Institute for National Security Studies, 28 November.