Bergson’s Notion of Duration as Drive

Yıl 2022, Sayı: 2, 123 - 140, 27.10.2022

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Öz

A renewed interest into the philosophy of Bergson in the last decades brings his central notion duration to the fore of lively discussions. This renewed interest certainly has its source in Deleuze’s Bergsonism, where he declared Bergson’s philosophy as an alternative to phenomenology that dominated the philosophical discussions throughout the 20th century. Deleuze’s attempt to put Bergson as an alternative to phenomenology was a protest against the phenomenological tradition, which denounced Bergson’s analysis of duration as it is first developed in Time and Free Will as remaining within the confines of psychological realism and reducing time to a flowing, fluid thing that resides in consciousness. In an attempt to contribute to the Deleuzian interpretation that defends Bergson’s notion of duration against its phenomenological criticisms, I argue in the present study that the notion of duration as developed by Bergson in Time and Free Will can be best interpreted in terms of a Leibnizian notion of force. Following Bergson’s criticism of reduction of time to a homogeneous medium in the work of Kant, I introduce Bergson’s analysis of duration as a drive that prolongs the past of consciousness into its present. In doing this I take a detour through Heidegger’s interpretation of Leibniz’s vis activa as drive.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Duration, Homogeneous Multiplicity, Heterogeneous Multiplicity, Drive, Past

İtki Olarak Bergson'un Süre Kavramı

Öz

Son yıllarda Bergson’un felsefesine yönelik yeniden canlanan bir ilgiyle birlikte felsefesinin temel kavramı olan sürenin canlı bir tartışma konusu olmasına tanık oluyoruz. Bu yenilenen ilginin kaynağında Deleuze’ün Bergsonculuk adlı eserinde Bergson felsefesini 20. Yüzyıl boyunca tüm felsefi tartışmaları belirlemiş olan fenomenolojinin karşısına bir alternatif olarak koyması var. Deleuze’ün Bergson’u fenomonolojiye alternatif farklı bir felsefi yaklaşım olarak koymasının altında Bergson’un Zaman ve Özgür İrade adlı eserinde geliştirmiş olduğu süre kavramını psikolojik gerçekçiliğin sınırları içinde kalmak ve zamanı bilincin içkinliğinde kendiliğinden akan akıcı bir şeye dönüştürmekle eleştiren fenomonolojik geleneğe yönelik bir protesto yatıyor. Bu çalışmada fenomenoloji alanından eleştirilere karşı Bergson’un süre kavramını savunan Deleuzcü bir okumaya katkı olarak, Bergson’un Zaman ve Özgür İrade adlı eserinde geliştirdiği süre kavramının Leibnizci kuvvet kavramı etrafında bir yorumunu geliştirmeye çalışıyorum. Bergson’un Kant’ın zamanı homojen bir ortam olarak ele almasına yönelik eleştirilerini takiben, süre kavramını geçmişi şimdinin içine temdit eden bir itki, bir kuvvet olarak yorumluyorum. Bunu yaparken Heidegger’in Leibniz’in vis activa kavramını itki olarak yorumlamasından yararlanıyorum.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Süre, Homojen Çokluk, Heterojen Çokluk, İtki, Geçmiş

Kaynakça

• Bergson H. (1912). Creative Evolution, (trans. Arthur Mitchell), London: Macmillian.
• Bergson H. (2005). Time and Free Will (trns. F. L. POgson), London: Elibron Classics.
• Bergson, H. (2002). The Creative Mind (trans. Mabelle L. Andison), New York: Citadel Press.
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• Bernet, R. (2010). “Bergson on the Driven Force of Consciousness and Life”, in Bergson and Phenomenology, ed. Michael Kelly, New York: Palgrave.
• Bernet, R. (2020). Force, Drive, Desire, trans. Sarah Allen, Illionis: Northwestern University Press.
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• Delueze, G. (1997). Cinema 1, (trans. Hugh Tomlinson and Barbara Habberjam), Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press.
• Heidegger, M. (1992). The Metaphysical Foundations of Logic (trans. Michael Heim), Bloomington: Indiana University Press.
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• Leibniz, G. W. (1989). Philosophical Papers and Letters (trans. Leroy E. Loemker), Dordrecht: Kluwer Academic Publishers.
• Leibniz, G.W. (1989a). Philosophical Essays (trans. Roger Ariew and Daniel Garber), Indianpolis: Hackett Publishing Company.
• Merleau-Ponty, M. (2002). Phenomenology of Perception (trans. Colin Smith), New York: Routledge.
• Sartre, J.P. (1948). The Psychology of Imagination, New York: Philosophical Library Inc.
• Worms, F. (2010).“Consciousness or Life? Bergson between Phenomenology and Metaphysics”, in Bergson and Phenomenology, ed. Michael R. Kelly, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.