A Non-Naturalist Metaethical Theory

Yıl 2021, , 195 - 229, 30.06.2021

Ahmet Yıldız

https://doi.org/10.35209/ksuifd.878230

Öz

One of the most important problems of metaethics, as a philosophy of ethics, is the question of whether moral qualities such as good and right have an objective reality. Metaethical theories are classified into realist and anti-realist theories, according to their answers to this main ontological question. The theories that answer this question positively have been called realist and others have been called antirealist. Realist metaethical theories are ethical naturalism and non-naturalism/ethical intuitionism. Anti-realist metaethical theories are subjectivism, non-cognitivism and nihilism. Ethical naturalism tries to recude ethical qualities to natural qualities. Ethical non-naturalism objects to this project. In this work we summarize metaethical problems, metaethical theories and non-naturalist metaethical theory. After that, we aim to justify the non-naturalist metaethical theory and we try to achieve this aim by discussing arguments for and against this metaethical position.

Naturalist Olmayan Realist Bir Metaetik Teori

Öz

Genel olarak etiğin felsefesi olarak değerlendirilebilecek olan metaetiğin en önemli sorularından birisi ahlâkî niteliklerin objektif bir gerçekliğe sahip olup olmadığı sorusudur. Bu soruya olumlu cevap veren teoriler genel olarak realist, olumsuz cevap veren teoriler ise anti-realist olarak isimlendirilmiştir. Realist metaetik teoriler sınıfı içerisinde natüralist/indirgemeci teoriler ve natüralist olmayan teori/ahlakî sezgicilik yer alırken, antirealist metaetik teoriler sınıfı içerisinde sübjektivist teoriler, gayr-i bilişselci teoriler ve nihilizm/hata teorisi yer alır. Realist grup içerisinde yer alan teorilerden natüralist yaklaşımlar ahlaki nitelikleri deney ve tecrübe konusu olabilecek bir takım doğal niteliklere indirgemeye çalışır. Naturalist olmayan yaklaşımlar ise, ahlâkî niteliklerin doğal niteliklere indirgenemeyen ayrı bir tür olduğunu savunur. Bu makalede metaetik, metaetik teoriler ve natüralist olmayan realist metaetik teori hakkında bir özet sunduktan sonra, natüralist olmayan realist bir metaetik teorinin haklılığını temellendirmeyi amaçladık. Bu temellen-dirmeyi yaparken bu teorinin lehindeki ve aleyhindeki argümanları değerlendirmeye dayalı bir yöntem izlemeye çalıştık.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Metaetik, Realizm, Naturalist Olmayan Realizm, Ahlaki Sezgicilik

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