The European Union’s Crisis Management Operations in Support of the United Nations in Sub-Saharan Africa: The Question of Legitimacy

Öz

This article aims to analyse legitimacy of military crisis management operations carried out by the EU in support of the UN in sub-Saharan Africa by using Mark Suchman’s typology of organizational legitimacy including pragmatic, moral and cognitive legitimacy. These three types of legitimacy are tested through analysing four cases in which EU has engaged in sub-Saharan Africa in support of the UN: Operation Artemis (2003), EUFOR RD CONGO (2006), EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2008-2009) and EUFOR RCA (2014-2015). In terms of pragmatic legitimacy, the EU enjoys high level of legitimacy, because these operations served both institutional interests of the EU and self-interests of some member states, particularly France. With regard to moral legitimacy, the EU suffers from a legitimacy deficit. Although declared motives for the launch of these operations was to help the UN in fulfilling its responsibility for the maintenance of international peace and security, indeed, EU engagement in these crisis management operations was to a significant degree driven by the institutional interests of the EU and interests of some individual member states. Moreover, all operations were UN-mandated autonomous EU military operations rather than integrated EU troops in UN-led operations. Thus, real motivation for launching the operations and their modalities undermined moral legitimacy of these operations, because it casted doubts on whether these operations has served the global common good or not. Furthermore, EU’s utilitarian, selective and self-interested use of its crisis management tool puts limit on the EU’s future reliability and taken-for-grantedness as a UN partner in protecting and promoting international peace and security, and thus resulted in cognitive legitimacy deficit.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• European Union
• United Nations
• Crisis Management
• sub-Saharan Africa
• Legitimacy

Avrupa Birliği’nin Birleşmiş Milletlere Destek Amacıyla Sahra-Altı Afrika’da Yürütmüş Olduğu Kriz Yönetimi Operasyonları: Meşruiyet Meselesi

Öz

Bu makalenin amacı, AB’nin Birleşmiş Milletlere (BM) destek olmak amacıyla Sahra-altı Afrika bölgesinde yürütmüş olduğu askeri kriz yönetimi operasyonlarının meşruiyetini Mark Suchman’ın pragmatik, ahlaki ve bilişsel olmak üzere üçlü bir sınıflandırmaya tabi tuttuğu örgütsel meşruiyet tipolojisi çerçevesinde analiz etmektir. Bu üçlü meşruiyet tiplojisi, Birliğin Sahra-altı Afrika bölgesinde BM’ye destek olmak amacıyla yürütmüş olduğu dört askeri kriz yönetimi operasyonu çerçevesinde değerlendirilecektir: Artemis Operasyonu (2003), EUFOR RD CONGO (2006), EUFOR Tchad/RCA (2008-2009) ve EUFOR RCA (2014-2015). Bütün operasyonların hem Birliğin kurumsal çıkarlarına hem de Fransa gibi önde gelen üye devletlerin bölgesel çıkarlarına hizmet etmesi, Birliğe yüksek düzeyde bir pragmatik meşruiyet sağlamaktadır. Buna karşılık ahlaki ve bilişsel meşruiyet açılarında Birlik ciddi bir meşruiyet açığı ile karşı karşıyadır. Her ne kadar Birlik, bu operasyonların başlatılma sebebini BM’ye temel sorumluluğu olan uluslararası barış güvenliği koruma konusunda destek olma olarak açıklamış olsa da esas neden gerek Birliğin kurumsal çıkarları gerekse bazı üye devletlerin özel çıkarlarının korunmasıdır. Bunun yanında, bu operasyonlar, Birlik askerlerinin doğrudan BM komutası altındaki bir operasyona katılımından ziyade BM tarafından yetkilendirilmiş bağımsız AB operasyonlarıdır. Bu iki özellik yani operasyonların gerisindeki gerçek motivasyon ve operasyonların yürütülme tarzı bu operasyonların ahlaki meşruiyetini zayıflatmaktadır. Bunun temel nedeni ise bu iki özelliğin, bu operasyonların küresel ortak fayda olan uluslararası barış ve güvenliğin korunması amacıyla başlatılıp başlatılmadığı konusunda ciddi şüphelere neden olmasıdır. Ayrıca, Birliğin kriz yönetimi aracını faydacı, seçici ve özçıkarları için kullanması, uluslararası barış ve güvenliğin korunmasında BM’nin partneri olarak Birliğin gelecekteki güvenilirliğini azaltmakta ve bu şeklide de kriz yönetimi operasyonlarının bilişsel meşruiyetini zayıflatmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Avrupa Birliği
• Birleşmiş Milletler
• Kriz Yönetimi
• Sahra-altı Afrika
• Meşruiyet

Kaynakça

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