Rekabetçi Otoriter Rejimlerde Ulusaltı Seçimlerin ve Ulusaltı Siyasetin Önemi: Meksika’dan PAN Örneği

Yıl 2021, , 135 - 155, 31.03.2021

Mustafa Cem Oğuz

https://doi.org/10.14782/marmarasbd.798902

Cited By: 1

Öz

Rekabetçi otoriter rejimlerden çıkışta en etkili stratejilerden biri “seçim ittifaklarıdır”. Fakat seçim ittifaklarına göre uzun vadede sonuç alınan bir strateji daha vardır, o da ulusaltı siyaseti demokratikleştirmektir. Buna göre muhalefet ulusaltı seçimlerde elde ettiği yönetsel birimi (eyalet veya belediye) demokratikleştirir ve de buralarda başarılı bir performans sergilerse bu başarı çevre birimlere de yayılma eğilimi gösterecektir. Ortaya çıkan bu demokratik anklavlar nihai noktada ulusal siyaseti de dönüştürecek ve otoriter rejime son verecektir. Çalışmada bu strateji Meksika’dan PAN örneği üzerinden incelenecektir. Yetmiş yıllık PRI iktidarına 2000 yılında son veren PAN diğer muhalefet partilerinin aksine stratejisini ulusaltı siyaset üzerinden kurmuş ve yaklaşık on iki yıllık bir sürede iktidarı elde etmiştir. PAN’ın zaferinin nedenlerine eğilen çalışmanın bulguları şu şekildedir; PAN ulusaltı yönetsel birimleri elde ederek, ulusal düzeyde tanınırlık kazanmış ve eş zamanda maddi kaynaklara erişmiştir; yönettiği birimlerde sivil ve siyasal özgürlükleri güçlendirmiş ve demokratik anklavlar yaratmıştır; seçmenin siyasal davranışını dönüştürmüş ve “katılımcı yurttaşlık” kültürünü güçlendirmiştir; ve son olarak eyalet parlamentolarının kurumsallaşmasını sağlamış ve böylece ülkede yasama-yürütme ilişkilerine demokratik bir model sunmuştur.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Ulusaltı Siyaset, Demokratik Anklavlar, Rekabetçi Otoriter Rejimler, PRI, PAN

The Importance of Subnational Elections and Subnational Politics in Competitive Authoritarian Regimes: The Case of PAN from Mexico

Öz

One of the most effective strategies to exit from competitive authoritarian regimes is “electoral alliances”. However, there is one more long-term strategy than electoral alliances, which is to democratize sub- national politics. According to this strategy, if the opposition democratizes the administrative unit (states or municipalities) that it gained in sub-national elections and performs successfully in these, this success will tend to spread to the peripheral units. These emerging democratic enclaves will ultimately transform national politics and put an end to authoritarianism. In the study, this strategy will be examined through the case of PAN from Mexico. PAN, which ended the seventy-year-old PRI rule in 2000, unlike other opposition parties, established its strategy on sub-national politics and gained Power in about twelve years. The findings of the study focusing on the reasons for PAN’s victory are as follows: PAN gained national recognition by gaining subnational administrative units and simultaneously accessed financial resources; strengthened civil and political freedoms and created democratic enclaves in the units it ruled; transformed the political behavior of the electorate and strengthened the culture of “participatory citizenship”; and finally, it institutionalized the state parliaments and thus presented a democratic model of legislative-executive relations in the country.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Subnational Politics, Democratic Enclaves, Competitive Authoritarian Regimes, PRI, PAN

Kaynakça

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