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Hizmet Kayırmacılığının Kuramsal Çerçevesi

Yıl 2022, , 131 - 160, 21.10.2022
https://doi.org/10.33203/mfy.1139452

Öz

Devletin ekonomideki hacmi gerek iktisadi yaklaşımlardan gerekse devletin üstlendiği fonksiyonlardan zaman içinde etkilenmiştir. Devletin ekonomiye müdahalesi bir yandan piyasa başarısızlıklarını ortadan kaldırma amacına hizmet ederken, diğer yandan devletin başarısızlıklarının artmasının da nedeni olmuştur. Devletin başarısızlıkları arasında yer alan hizmet kayırmacılığı, politikacıların kamu kaynaklarını tekrar seçilme amacıyla dağıtmaları sonucunda, ekonomik etkinsizliklere yol açan bir siyasal yozlaşma türüdür. Ülkelerde uygulanan seçim sistemi, bütçe süreci, komisyonların varlığı, siyasi rejim, ideolojik ve partizan tutumlar gibi faktörler hizmet kayırmacılığını etkilemektedir. Türkiye’de ise hizmet kayırmacılığı genellikle parti politikaları çerçevesinde gerçekleşmektedir.

Kaynakça

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THE THEORETICAL FRAMEWORK OF PORK BARRELING

Yıl 2022, , 131 - 160, 21.10.2022
https://doi.org/10.33203/mfy.1139452

Öz

The size of the public sector has been affected by both economic approaches and the functions undertaken by the state over time. While government intervention served the purpose of eliminating market failures, it also caused the increase in government failures. Pork barrel, which is among the government failures, is a type of political corruption that causes to economic inefficiencies as politicians distribute public resources for reelection. Factors such as the electoral system applied in the countries, the budget process, the existence of commissions, the political regime, electoral systems, ideological and partisan attitudes affect the pork barreling. Pork barreling generally occurs within the framework of party policies in Turkey.

Kaynakça

  • Akalın, G. (1986). Kamu Ekonomisi. İkinci Basım. Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, No: 554.
  • Aktan, C. C. (2002). Siyasal Ahlak ve Siyasal Yozlaşma. C. C. Aktan (Ed.), Yolsuzlukla Mücadele Stratejileri. Ankara: Hak-İş Yayınları.
  • Aldrich, J. M. (1997). When Is It Rational to Vote?. Dennis C. Mueller (Ed.), Perspectives on Public Choice A Handbook (pp. 373-390). Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.
  • Alvarez, M. & Saving J. (1995). Deficits, Democrats, and Distributive Benefits: Congressional Elections and the Pork Barrel in the 1980s. Social Science Working Paper, No: 928, 1-20.
  • Ames, B. (1995). Electoral Rules, Constituency Pressures, and Pork Barrel: Bases of Voting in The Brazilian Congress. The Journal of Politics, 57(2), 324-343.
  • Arslan, A. (2004). 5018 Sayılı Kamu Mali Yönetimi ve Kontrol Kanunu ile Kamu Harcama Sisteminde Yapılan Düzenlemeler. Maliye Dergisi, 145(1), 1-44.
  • Aydın, M. A. (2007). Milletvekili Adaylarının Belirlenme Usulü ve Önseçim. Yasama Dergisi, 5, 82-108.
  • Baron, D. (1991). Majoritarian Incentives, Pork Barrel Programs, and Procedural Control. American Journal of Political Science, 35(1), 57–90.
  • Bayrakçı, B. (2000). Siyasal Yozlaşma ve Ekonomik Gelişmeye Etkileri. Erciyes Üniversitesi İktisadi ve İdari Bilimler Fakültesi Dergisi, 16, 133-163.
  • Bertholini, F., Pereira, C. & Renno, L. (2018). Pork is Policy: Dissipative Inclusion at The Local Level. Governance, 31(4), 701-720.
  • Bickers, K. N. & Stein, R. M. (1996). The Electoral Dynamics of The Federal Pork Barrel. American Journal of Political Science, 40(4), 1300-1326.
  • Blöndal, J. R., Kraan, D. J. & Ruffner, M. (2003). Budgeting in The United States. OECD Journal on Budgeting, 3(2), 7-53.
  • Bosuter, K. (1969). Türk Siyasi Partiler Sisteminde Parti İçi Demokrasi. Ankara: Ulusal Basımevi.
  • Bowler, S., Farrell, D. M. & Mcallister, I. (1996). Constituency Campaigning in Parliamentary Systems with Preferential Voting: Is there a Paradox?. Electoral Studies, 15(4), 461-476.
  • Brusco, V., Nazareno, M. & Stokes, S. (2004). Vote Buying in Argentina. Latin American Research Review, 39(2), 66–88.
  • Buchanan, J. M. (1987). The Constitution of Economic Policy. The American Economic Review, 77(3), 243-250.
  • Buchanan, J. M. (2003). Public Choice: The Origins and Development of a Research Program, Center for Study of Public Choice, Virginia: George Mason University.
  • Buchanan, J. M. (2009). Politics without Romance: A Sketch of Positive Public Choice Theory and Its Normative Implications. James M. Buchanan & Robert D. Tollison (Eds.), The Theory of Public Choice–II (pp. 11-22), The University of Michigan Press.
  • Buchanan, J. M. & Tullock, G. (1969). The Calculus of Consent – Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Third Edition. Ann Arbor Paperbacks. The University of Michigan Press.
  • Buchanan, J. M. & Tullock, G. (1999). The Calculus of Consent – Logical Foundations of Constitutional Democracy. Indianapolis: Liberty Fund Inc.
  • Buchanan, J. M. & Wagner, R. E. (1977). Democracy in Deficit – The Political Legacy of Lord Keynes, Center for Study of Public Choice. New York: Academic Press.
  • BÜMKO, http://www.bumko.gov.tr/TR,41/butce-hazirlama-sureci.html, (20.09.2018).
  • Calvo, E. & Murillo, M. V. (2004). Who Delivers? Partisan Clients in the Argentine Electoral Market. American Journal of Political Science, 48(4), 742-757.
  • Catalinac, A., Bueno De Mesquita, B. & Smith, A. (2020). A Tournament Theory of Pork Barrel Politics: The Case of Japan. Comparative Political Studies, 53(10-11), 1619-1655.
  • Congleton, R. D. (2007). Informational Limits to Public Policy: Ignorance and The Jury Theorem. José Casas Pardo & Pedro Schwartz (Eds.), Public Choice and the Challenges of Democracy (pp. 206-219). Cheltenham, UK: Edward Elgar Publishing Limited.
  • Cox, G. W. & Mccubbins, M. D. (1986). Electoral Politics As A Redistributive Game. The Journal of Politics, 48(2), 370-389.
  • Çeliker, E. (2006). Plan ve Bütçe Komisyonu: Gelişimi ve Yasama Sürecindeki İşlevi. Yasama Dergisi, 2, 5-31.
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  • Shepsle, K., & Wringast, B. (1981). Political Preferences for The Pork Barrel: A Generalization. American Journal of Political Science, 25(1), 96–111.
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  • Skousen, M. (2014). İktisadi Düşünce Tarihi–Modern İktisadın İnşası, 6. Baskı. (Çev. Mustafa Acar, Ekrem Erdem & Metin Toprak). Ankara: Adres Yayınları.
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  • Stein, R. M. & Bickers, K. N. (1994). Congressional Elections and The Pork Barrel. The Journal of Politics, 56(2), 377-399.
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  • Yaraşır, S. (2011). Hizmet Kayırmacılığı ve Türkiye’de Kamu Yatırımlarının Dağılımını Belirleyen Faktörler (Basılmamış Doktora Tezi). İstanbul Üniversitesi Sosyal Bilimler Enstitüsü. İstanbul.
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Toplam 109 adet kaynakça vardır.

Ayrıntılar

Birincil Dil Türkçe
Konular Finans
Bölüm Makaleler
Yazarlar

Ersin Yavuz 0000-0002-2543-3393

Sevinç Yaraşır Tülümce 0000-0003-0198-5545

Yayımlanma Tarihi 21 Ekim 2022
Gönderilme Tarihi 1 Temmuz 2022
Yayımlandığı Sayı Yıl 2022

Kaynak Göster

APA Yavuz, E., & Yaraşır Tülümce, S. (2022). Hizmet Kayırmacılığının Kuramsal Çerçevesi. Maliye Ve Finans Yazıları(118), 131-160. https://doi.org/10.33203/mfy.1139452

Dergi özellikle maliye, finans ve bankacılık alanlarında faaliyet göstermektedir.