Küresel Güvenlik Girişimi’nin Orta Asya’da Çin-Rusya İlişkilerine Etkisi

Yıl 2025, Cilt: 14 Sayı: 1, 422 - 437, 15.01.2025

Ümit Alperen

https://doi.org/10.33206/mjss.1570294

Öz

Çin Devlet Başkanı Xi Jinping’in 2022’de ilan ettiği ‘Küresel Güvenlik Girişimi’ (KGG), Pekin’in bölgesel ve küresel güvenliğe yaklaşımında önemli bir sistematik değişime işaret etmektedir. Küresel düzeyde artan Çin-ABD rekabeti, Rusya’nın Ukrayna’yı işgali, Orta Asya’da ortaya çıkan güvenlik boşluğu gibi gelişmeler Pekin’in küresel ve bölgesel güvenlik yaklaşımını etkilemektedir. Bu gelişmeler karşısında Çin ulusal çıkarlarını korumak için küresel ve bölgesel güvenlik yönetişiminde aktif rol oynamaya çalışmaktadır. Bu çalışma, Çinli karar alıcıların KGG bağlamında neden Orta Asya’da daha etkin bir güvenlik rolü oynamak istedikleri ve bu durumun bölgede Çin-Rusya ilişkilerine muhtemel etkilerini incelemektedir. Bu makale, Rusya’nın Batıyla yaşadığı sorunlar nedeniyle Çin’in Orta Asya güvenliğinde oynamak istediği etkin role sessiz bir rıza gösterse de orta ve uzun vadede iki aktör arasında sorunlara yol açabileceği savunulmaktadır. Bu çerçevede, Çin’in Orta Asya’da potansiyel gelişmiş güvenlik rolüne bütüncül ve detaylı bir bakış açısı geliştirilmesi hedeflenmektedir. Böylece Çin’in Orta Asya’da oynamak istediği güvenlik rolünün de muhtemel sınırları belirlenmeye ve Rusya’yla bölgedeki ilişkilerine nasıl yansıyacağı analiz edilmeye çalışılmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Küresel Güvenlik Girişimi, Çin, Orta Asya, Rusya

Etik Beyan

“Küresel Güvenlik Girişimi’nin Orta Asya’da Çin-Rusya İlişlilerine Etkisi” başlıklı çalışmanın yazım sürecinde bilimsel kurallara, etik ve alıntı kurallarına uyulmuş; toplanan veriler üzerinde herhangi bir tahrifat yapılmamış ve bu çalışma herhangi başka bir akademik yayın ortamına değerlendirme için gönderilmemiştir.

An Analysis of the Impact of the Global Security Initiative on China-Russia Relations in Central Asia

Öz

The announcement of the 'Global Security Initiative' (GSI) by Chinese President Xi Jinping in 2022 signifies a paradigm shift in Beijing's strategy towards regional and international security. Beijing's strategy for both regional and global security is being impacted by factors like escalated Sino-U.S. rivalry in the global sphere, Russia's invasion of Ukraine, and the expanding security gap in Central Asia. This paper examines at the KGG, the reasons for Chinese authorities' desire to be more engaged in Central Asian security, and the potential effects on China-Russia relations in the region. Moreover, this study argues that even if Russia gives silent consent to the active role China wants to play in Central Asian security due to its problems with the West, it may cause problems between the two actors in the medium and long term. This framework, it is aimed to develop a holistic and detailed perspective on China's potential enhanced security role in Central Asia. Thus, the possible limits of the security role China seeks to play in Central Asia and the implications for its relations with Russia in the region are analyzed.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Global Security Initiative, China, Central Asia, Russia

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