Rusya Federasyonu’nun Kırım’ı ilhakı ve sonrasında ortaya çıkan jeopolitik durum

Öz

Rusya’nın 2014 yılında Kırım’ı bir oldubitti ile işgali ve ilhakı günümüz uluslararası sisteminde, konu tırmandırılmak istenmediği için geçiştirilmiş olsa da, önemsiz ve sıradan bir olay değildir. Zira İkinci Dünya Savaşı’nın sona ermesinden bu yana Avrupa’da bir devlet diğer bir devletin bir parçasını bu şekilde ilhak etmiş değildir. Her ne kadar Rusya Federasyonu bu işgali zorlama tedbirlerle uluslararası hukuka uydurma çalışmış olsa da öne sürdüğü sebepler uluslararası toplumda kabul görmemiştir. Ancak hiçbir devlet yeni bir savaş başlatmak istemediği için kriz tırmandırılmamıştır. Bunun yerine ekonomik tedbirler ve yaptırımlarla Rusya Federasyonu çevrelenmeye ve caydırılmaya çalışılmıştır. Bu çalışmada Rusya ile Ukrayna arasında Euromaidan olaylarından sonra hızla tırmanmaya başlayan ve 2022 yılı Şubat ayında savaşa dönüşen gerginlik ve çatışmanın gelişimi ve bu gelişim içerisinde Kırım’ın işgali süreci incelenecektir. Yine çalışma kapsamında Rusya Federasyonu’nu kışkırtan ve karşı önlem almasına yol açan sebeplere değinilecektir. Bunu yapmak için bir literatür taraması gerçekleştirilmiştir. Bu literatür taraması kapsamında öncelikle Kremlin kaynaklı dokümanlar incelenmiştir. Bu dokümanlar konu ile ilgili çalışmalarla sentezlenerek çalışmanın kavramsal çerçevesi oluşturulmuştur. Kavramsal çerçeve oluşturulduktan sonra Rusya Federasyonu’nun Kırım’ın işgali için uygulamaya koyduğu politikalar ve taktikler tespit edilmiş ve tartışılmıştır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Ukrayna
• Kırım Yarımadası
• Karadeniz Bölgesi
• Rus Dışpolitikası
• Eleştirel Jeopolitik

Russian Federation’s annexation of crimea and its geopolitical reflections

Öz

Russia's occupation and annexation of Crimea in 2014 as a fait accompli is not an insignificant and ordinary event in today's international system, although the issue has been glossed over especially by the Western powers, because they did not wanted to provoke a war. Since the end of the Second World War, no European state has annexed a part of another state in this way. Although the Russian Federation tried to adapt this occupation to international law with coercive measures, the reasons that Russia put forward were not accepted by the international community. However, the crisis did not escalate as no state wanted to start a new war. Instead, the Russian Federation was tried to be contained and deterred by economic measures and sanctions. In this study, the development of tension and conflict between Russia and Ukraine, which started to escalate after the Euromaidan events and turned into war in February 2022, and the occupation of Crimea within this historical course will be examined. In this study, the reasons that provoked the Russian Federation and caused it to take countermeasures will be mentioned. To do this, a literature review was conducted. Within the scope of this literature review, documents originating from the Kremlin were examined first. These documents were synthesized with studies related to the subject and the conceptual framework of the study was formed. After the conceptual framework was created, the policies and tactics implemented by the Russian Federation for the invasion of Crimea were determined and discussed.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Ukraine
• Crimean Peninsula
• Blacksea Region
• Russian Foreign Policy
• Critical Geopolitics

Kaynakça

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