ЭНЕРГЕТИЧЕСКАЯ ДИПЛОМАТИЯ РОССИИ ПОСЛЕ ВОЙНЫ НА УКРАИНЕ

Yıl 2025, Sayı: 14, 297 - 327, 31.12.2025

Bahar Özsoy

https://doi.org/10.48068/rusad.1733114

Öz

Низкие доходы от продажи энергоносителей, политическая нерешительность и отчасти неудачная дипломатия лидеров не позволили России стать глобальным игроком на протяжении 90-х годов. В то время, когда ее влияние на постсоветском пространстве оказалось под угрозой со стороны некоторых стран региона, приход к власти Владимира Путина и рост цен на энергоносители помогли внешней политике набрать силу. В частности, Россия ответила на претензии США на глобальное лидерство и стратегию сдерживания ЕС своей энергетической мощью. В этом контексте одним из главных направлений борьбы стала Украина. Начавшись в 2004 году с Оранжевой революции и продолжившись событиями Евромайдана в 2013 году, российско-украинский кризис привел к незаконной аннексии Крыма в 2014 году. В этот период Россия подверглась ряду международных санкций и решила сотрудничать с Азией в рамках стратегии «Поворот на Восток». Однако размер европейского рынка, широта инфраструктуры и улучшение отношений со временем не позволили Востоку стать приоритетным регионом.
Военная агрессия России в Украине в феврале 2022 года привела к тому, что европейско-российские отношения оказались на самом низком уровне за всю постсоветскую эпоху. Санкции, введенные против России на международном уровне, и использование Москвой своей энергетической мощи сделали сотрудничество неустойчивым. Европейский союз быстро разработал политику, направленную на адаптацию к войне и послевоенному периоду. ЕС уделяет первостепенное внимание снижению энергетической зависимости от России за счет мер по повышению энергоэффективности и перехода к «зеленой» энергетике, а также расширил энергетическое сотрудничество с рядом стран-экспортеров, включая Норвегию, Катар, Нигерию, Саудовскую Аравию, США, Казахстан и Азербайджан. С другой стороны, энергетическая дипломатия Москвы приобрела новое измерение в тени российско-украинской войны. После кризиса в отношениях с ЕС Россия, с одной стороны, сосредоточилась на производстве СПГ, а с другой стороны, в 2014 году в рамках своей стратегии сместила акцент на азиатский рынок. Россия сталкивается с осторожностью Китая на рынке, где она не новичок, но имеет небольшой опыт. Основной тезис исследования заключается в том, что технологические и финансовые требования превратили Китай в великого партнера по сотрудничеству в новую эпоху энергетической дипломатии Москвы. В этом контексте исследование фокусируется на энергетической дипломатии Москвы и ее последствиях после февраля 2022 года.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Россия , энергетика , Китай , ЕС , война на Украине , Арктика

UKRAYNA SAVAŞI SONRASI RUSYA’NIN ENERJİ DİPLOMASİSİ

Öz

Düşük enerji gelirleri, siyasi kararsızlık ve kısmen başarısız lider diplomasisi 90’lı yıllar boyunca Rusya’nın küresel bir aktör olarak öne çıkmasını engellemiştir. Eski Sovyet coğrafyasındaki nüfuzunun kimi bölge ülkeleri tarafından tehdit edilmeye başladığı dönemde Vladimir Putin’in iktidara gelmesi ve yükselen enerji fiyatları dış politikanın güç kazanmasını sağlamıştır. Özellikle ABD’nin küresel liderlik iddiasına ve AB’nin çevreleme stratejisine Rusya sahip olduğu enerji gücü ile karşılık vermiştir. Bu çerçevede sürdürülen mücadelenin öne çıkan alanlarından biri de Ukrayna olmuştur. 2004 yılında Turuncu Devrim ile başlayıp, 2013 yılında Euromaidan olayları ile devam eden Rusya-Ukrayna gerginliği 2014 yılında Kırım’ın yasa dışı ilhakı ile sonuçlanmıştır. Bu dönemde Rusya uluslararası alanda birtakım yaptırımlara uğramış ve Doğu’ya Dön stratejisi çerçevesinde Asya ile iş birliğine yönelme kararı almıştır. Ancak Avrupa pazarının büyüklüğü, altyapı imkanlarının genişliği ve zaman içinde düzelen ilişkiler Doğu’nun öncelikli bir bölge haline gelmesini engellemiştir.
Şubat 2022’de Rusya’nın Ukrayna’ya müdahalesi Avrupa-Rusya ilişkilerini Sovyet sonrası dönemin en düşük seviyelerine çekmiştir. Uluslararası alanda Rusya’ya uygulanan yaptırımlar ve Moskova’nın enerji gücünü kullanmaya başlaması iş birliğini sürdürülebilir olmaktan çıkarmıştır. Avrupa Birliği hızlı bir şekilde savaşa ve savaş sonrası sürece uyum sağlayacak politikalar geliştirmiştir. Rusya’ya olan enerji bağımlılığının azaltılmasını önceleyen AB, tasarruf tedbirleri ve yeşil enerji dönüşümünün yanı sıra aralarında Norveç, Katar, Nijerya, Suudi Arabistan, ABD, Kazakistan ve Azerbaycan’ın bulunduğu bir sıra ihracat ülkesi ile enerji iş birliğini genişletmiştir. Diğer taraftan Rusya-Ukrayna savaşının gölgesinde Moskova enerji diplomasisi ise yeni bir boyut kazanmıştır. AB ile yaşanan krizin ardından Rusya bir yandan LNG üretimine ağırlık verirken diğer yandan 2014 yılındaki stratejisi kapsamında Asya pazarına yönelmiştir. Rusya yeni olmadığı ancak deneyiminin az olduğu bu pazarda Çin’in ihtiyatlılığı ile karşı karşıyadır. Çalışmanın temel tezi teknoloji ve finansmana olan ihtiyacı Moskova’nın yeni dönem enerji diplomasisinde Çin’i iş birliğinin büyük ortağına dönüştürdüğüdür. Bu kapsamda çalışma, Şubat 2022 yılından sonra Moskova’nın uyguladığı enerji diplomasisine ve etkilerine odaklanmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Rusya , Enerji , Çin , AB , Ukrayna Savaşı , Arktik

RUSSIA’S ENERGY DIPLOMACY AFTER THE UKRAINE WAR

Öz

Low energy revenues, political indecision and partly failed leader diplomacy prevented Russia from emerging as a global actor throughout the 90s. At a time when some countries in the region were threatening to exert their influence in the post-Soviet space, Vladimir Putin’s rise to power and rising energy prices helped bolster foreign policy. In particular, Russia has responded to the US claim to global leadership and the EU’s containment strategy with its energy power. In this context, one of the main areas of struggle has been Ukraine. Starting in 2004 with the Orange Revolution and continuing with the Euromaidan events in 2013, the Russian-Ukrainian crisis led to the illegal annexation of Crimea in 2014. During this period, Russia was subjected to several international sanctions and decided to cooperate with Asia within the framework of the "Turn East" strategy. However, the size of the European market, the breadth of infrastructure and improved relations over time have prevented the East from becoming a priority region.
Russia’s military aggression in Ukraine in February 2022 has brought European-Russian relations to the lowest levels of the post-Soviet era. The international sanctions imposed on Russia, combined with Moscow’s use of its energy power, have made cooperation unsustainable. The European Union has rapidly developed policies to adapt to the war and the post-war period. The EU has prioritised reducing its energy dependence on Russia through energy efficiency measures and a green energy transition, and has expanded energy cooperation with several exporting countries, including Norway, Qatar, Nigeria, Saudi Arabia, the US, Kazakhstan, and Azerbaijan. On the other hand, Moscow’s energy diplomacy has taken on a new dimension in the wake of the Russia-Ukraine war. Following the crisis with the EU, Russia, on the one hand, focused on LNG production, and on the other hand, shifted its attention to the Asian market as part of its strategy in 2014. Russia faces China’s cautiousness in a market where it is not new but has little experience. The central thesis of the study is that technological and financial requirements have transformed China into a great partner of cooperation in Moscow’s new era of energy diplomacy. In this context, the study focuses on Moscow’s energy diplomacy and its effects following the events of February 2022.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Russia , Energy , China , EU , Ukraine War , Arctic

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