Unfolding the Connection between the Kantian Self and Time

Yıl 2019, , 245 - 260, 19.06.2019

Volkan Çifteci

https://doi.org/10.21497/sefad.586617

Öz

In Kant’s Critique of Pure Reason,
the self and time are interwoven on three different levels. To unveil this
relation, this paper refers back to Kant’s criticism directed to the ideas of
early modern philosophers concerning the two notions in question. On the three
levels, three different conceptions of the self correspond to three aspects of
time. In the first aspect we encounter the self as inner sense (appearance) and time reveals itself as the form of this sense. The first aspect of
the self thus cannot be known as it is in
itself; on the contrary, it can be known only as an appearance. Later, in virtue of the act of imagination, while the second aspect of
the self is unfolded as a temporal self, time comes forth as formal intuition. In this level, the
self starts to become conscious of its temporal character. Finally, in the
third aspect, the relation between the transcendental unity of the self (apperception) and the unity of time
becomes transparent. In the course of analyzing the three corresponding aspects
of the self and time, this paper aims to reveal both the temporal character of
the Kantian self and the subjective character of time.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Self, time, inner sense, imagination, apperception

Kant’ta Kendilik ve Zaman Arasındaki İlişkinin Açımlanması

Öz

Kant’ın Saf Aklın Eleştirisi’nde, kendilik
ve zaman üç farklı seviyede birbirleriyle iç içedir. Bu durumu açık kılmak
için, bu makalede, erken modern dönem düşünürlerin kendilik ve zamana ilişkin
fikirlerine, Kant’ın yönelttiği eleştirileri ele alıyoruz. Söz konusu üç
seviyede, kendiliğin üç farklı yönü, zamanın üç yönüne denk düşer. İlk
seviyede, kendilik iç duyu (görünüş)
ve zaman ise bu duyunun formu olarak
ortaya çıkar. O halde, kendiliğin ilk yönü, kendinde olduğu haliyle değil,
ancak bize görünen haliyle bilinebilir. Daha sonra, imgelem sayesinde, kendiliğin ikinci yönü zamansal kendilik olarak ortaya çıkarken; zaman, biçimsel görü olarak ortaya koyulur. Bu
seviyede, kendilik, zamansal yönünün bilincine varmaya başlar. Son olarak,
üçüncü seviyede, kendiliğin aşkınsal birliği (tamalgı) ve zamanın birliği arasındaki ilişki açık bir hale gelir.
Kendilik ve zamanın birbirine karşılık gelen üç yönünü çözümleme sürecinde, bu
makalenin amaçladığı şey, Kant’ın kendilik anlayışının zamansal özelliğini
gösterirken bir yandan da zamanın öznel oluşunu aydınlatabilmektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Kendilik, zaman, iç duyu, imgelem, tamalgı

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