An Expected Development in American Administrative Law: Chevron Doctrine No Longer Applicable

Yıl 2024, Cilt: 12 Sayı: 2, 1015 - 1032

Özge Atıl Kaya

https://doi.org/10.56701/shd.1556935

Öz

The Chevron doctrine is an important principle used in the United States for the judicial review of the authority of the administration to interpret laws and legal texts when making and implementing legal regulations. Chevron, a groundbreaking principle in American administrative law, upheld the discretionary power of the administration, resulting in the necessity for the courts to respect the authority of the administration to interpret the law. The Chevron doctrine was established by the United States Supreme Court in the 1984 case of Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. Since 1984, Chevron has been frequently used by the Supreme Court and federal appellate and district courts in many cases. The doctrine has been defended on the grounds of expertise and know-how, efficiency, democratic accountability, and judicial burden relief, but has also been subjected to intense criticism by jurists and politicians. The main criticisms of Chevron are contradiction to the principle of separation of powers, weakening of the judiciary and its independence, excessive use of authority, legal uncertainty and inconsistencies in practice. Especially in recent times, it has been revealed that the courts have been cautious in applying Chevron due to the intensified criticism and the applicability of the doctrine has significantly decreased. Ultimately, the Chevron doctrine was annulled by the Supreme Court in Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo on June 28, 2024. It is thought that the annulment of Chevron will greatly limit the authority of the administration to interpret laws and legal texts, eliminate the obligation of the courts to comply with the administration's interpretations and strengthen the role of the judiciary. This study examines the history of the Chevron doctrine, its scope and basic principles, its evolution over the years, its applicability today, and the effects of its annulment on the judicial review of the administration.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Chevron, United States, Administration, Administrative Discretion, Judicial Review

Amerikan İdare Hukuku’nda Beklenen Gelişme: Chevron Doktrini Artık Hükümsüz

Öz

Chevron doktrini, Amerika Birleşik Devletleri’nde idarenin hukuki düzenlemeler yaparken ve uygularken, yasaları ve hukuki metinleri yorumlama yetkisinin yargısal denetiminde kullanılan önemli bir ilkedir. Amerikan idare hukukunda çığır açan Chevron, idarenin takdir yetkisini destekleyerek mahkemelerin idarenin hukuki yorumlama yetkisine riayet etmesi gerekliliği sonucunu doğurmuştur. Chevron doktrini, Amerikan Yüksek Mahkemesi’nce 1984 tarihli Chevron U.S.A., Inc. v. Natural Resources Defense Council, Inc. davasında ortaya konulmuştur. Chevron, 1984’ten itibaren Yüksek Mahkeme ve federal temyiz ve bölge mahkemeleri tarafından birçok davada sıklıkla kullanılmıştır. Doktrin; uzmanlık ve teknik bilgi, verimlilik, demokratik hesap verebilirlik ve yargı yükününün hafifletilmesi gibi nedenlerle savunulmasının yanı sıra hukukçular ve siyasetçiler tarafından yoğun eleştirilere maruz kalmıştır. Chevron’a yöneltilen eleştirilerin başında; kuvvetler ayrılığı ilkesine aykırılık, yargı organının ve bağımsızlığının zayıflatılması, aşırı yetki kullanımı, hukuki belirsizlik ve uygulamadaki tutarsızlıklar gelmektedir. Özellikle son dönemlerde, yoğunlaşan eleştirilerin de etkisiyle mahkemelerin Chevron’u uygularken temkinli davrandığı ve doktrinin uygulanabilirliğinin önemli ölçüde azaldığı ortaya konulmuştur. En nihayetinde Chevron doktrini, 28 Haziran 2024’te Loper Bright Enterprises v. Raimondo davasında Yüksek Mahkeme tarafından oyçokluğuyla iptal edilmiştir. Chevron’un iptalinin; idarenin yasaları ve hukuki metinleri yorumlama yetkisini büyük ölçüde sınırlayacağı, mahkemelerin idarenin yorumlarına riayet etme zorunluluğunu ortadan kaldıracağı ve yargının rolünü güçlendireceği düşünülmektedir. Bu çalışma, Chevron doktrininin tarihçesinin, kapsam ve temel prensiplerinin, yıllar içerisindeki değişiminin, günümüzde uygulanabilirliğinin ve iptalinin idarenin yargısal denetimi üzerindeki etkilerinin incelenmesini içerir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Chevron, Amerika, İdare, İdarenin Takdir Yetkisi, Yargısal Denetim

Kaynakça

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