Stokastik Politika Rejimleri ve Firma Azaltım Stratejilerinin Evrimi: Çok Popülasyonlu Evrimsel Bir Model

Öz

Bu çalışma, stokastik çevre politikası rejimlerinin firma azaltım stratejilerinin uzun dönemli dağılımını nasıl şekillendirdiğini analiz etmek amacıyla çok popülasyonlu evrimsel oyun teorisi temelli bir model geliştirmektedir. Modelde, firmalar temiz teknoloji benimseyenler, kısmi uyum sağlayanlar ve hiç uyum göstermeyenler olmak üzere farklı stratejik tiplere ayrılmış heterojen bir popülasyon olarak ele alınmaktadır. Bu firmaların getiri yapıları; yürürlükteki düzenleyici sıkılık düzeyi, azaltım maliyetleri ve piyasa temelli teşviklere bağlıdır. Politika belirsizliği ise, sıkı ve gevşek düzenleyici rejimler arasında geçişleri yöneten bir Markov rejim değişim süreci olarak modellenmekte; böylece siyasal döngüler, yasama geri dönüşleri ve uygulama farklılıkları gibi gerçekçi dinamikler yakalanmaktadır. Rejim-bağımlı uygunluk fonksiyonlarıyla genişletilmiş replikatör dinamikleri kullanılarak, temiz teknoloji benimsenmesinin evrimsel olarak istikrarlı hale geldiği koşullar türetilmektedir. Analiz sonuçları, politika oynaklığının; düzenleyici rejimlerin kalıcılığı ve geçiş maliyetlerinin büyüklüğüne bağlı olarak, azaltım stratejilerinin yayılımını hızlandırabileceğini ya da yavaşlatabileceğini göstermektedir. Ayrıca, politika güvenilirliğine ilişkin kritik eşik değerlerin altında firmaların rasyonel olarak yeşil yatırımları ertelediği; bunun da yol bağımlı dengeler ve yüksek emisyon patikalarına kilitlenme olasılığı yarattığı ortaya konulmaktadır. Model, belirsizlik altında çevre politikası tasarımına ilişkin yeni çıkarımlar sunmakta; özellikle rejim istikrarı ile güvenilir taahhüt mekanizmalarının önemini vurgulamaktadır. Bu bulgular, evrimsel oyun teorisi, çevre ekonomisi ve endüstriyel organizasyon literatürlerinin kesişiminde yer alan çalışmalara katkı sağlayarak, politika riski ile firma düzeyinde azaltım kararları arasındaki stratejik etkileşimi biçimsel bir çerçevede ortaya koymaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Evrimsel Oyun Teorisi
• İktisat Teorisi
• Replikatör Dinamikleri.

Stochastic Policy Regimes and the Evolution of Firm Abatement Strategies: A Multi-Population Evolutionary Model

Öz

This paper develops a multi-population evolutionary game-theoretic model to analyze how stochastic environmental policy regimes shape the long-run distribution of firm abatement strategies. We consider a heterogeneous population of firms categorized into distinct strategic types—clean adopters, partial compliers, and non-adopters—whose payoffs depend on prevailing regulatory stringency, abatement costs, and market-based incentives. Policy uncertainty is modeled as a Markov-switching process that governs transitions between stringent and lax regulatory states, capturing the realistic dynamics of political cycles, legislative reversals, and enforcement variability. Using replicator dynamics augmented with regime-dependent fitness functions, we derive conditions under which clean technology adoption becomes evolutionarily stable. Our analysis reveals that policy volatility can either accelerate or impede the diffusion of abatement strategies depending on the persistence of regulatory states and the magnitude of switching costs. We identify critical thresholds in policy credibility below which firms rationally defer green investments, generating path-dependent equilibria and potential lock-in to high-emission trajectories. The model yields novel insights into the design of environmental policy under uncertainty, emphasizing the importance of regime stability and credible commitment mechanisms. Our findings contribute to the growing literature at the intersection of evolutionary game theory, environmental economics, and industrial organization by formalizing the strategic interplay between policy risk and firm-level abatement decisions.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Evolutionary Game Theory
• Economic Theory
• Replicator Dynamics.

Kaynakça

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