İlişkili Taraf İşlemleri ve Firma Değeri: Sürdürülebilirlik Performansının Aracı Etkisi

Yıl 2023, , 355 - 367, 28.04.2023

Utku Şendurur , Bekir Gerekan

https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2023.02.16

Öz

Bu çalışmada, ilişkili taraf işlemlerinin firma değerine etkisinde sürdürülebilirliğin aracı rolünün incelenmesine yönelik bir araştırma yapılmıştır. Çalışma, BİST 100 endeksinde işlem gören ve 2015-2021 yılları arasında düzenli olarak sürdürülebilirlik raporlaması yayımlayan 23 adet işletme şeklinde toplam 163 adet gözlemden oluşmaktadır. Çalışmada, dinamik panel tahmin yöntemlerinden biri olan Genelleştirilmiş Momentler Metodu kullanılmıştır. Çalışma sonuçlarına göre, ilişkili taraf borçlarının firma değeri üzerinde pozitif yönde, ilişkili taraf satışlarının ve alımlarının ise firma değeri üzerinde negatif yönde bir etkisi vardır. Ayrıca gerek sürdürülebilirlik gerekse sürdürülebilir sosyal sorumluluk faaliyetlerinin ilişkili taraf işlemleri ile firma değeri arasındaki ilişkiye aracılık ettiği tespit edilmiştir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

İlişkili Taraf İşlemleri, Sürdürülebilirlik Raporlaması, Firma Değeri

Related Parties Transactions and Firm Value: Intermediate Effect of Sustainability Performance

Öz

In this study, research was conducted to examine the intermediary role of sustainability in the effect of related party transactions on firm value. The study consists of 163 observations from 23 businesses traded in the BIST 100 index and regularly published sustainability reports between 2015 and 2021. In the study, the Generalized Moments Method, one of the dynamic panel estimation methods, was used. According to the study, related party debts positively affect firm value, while related party sales and purchases negatively affect firm value. In addition, it has been determined that sustainability and sustainable social responsibility activities mediate the relationship between related party transactions and firm value.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Related Party Transactions, Sustainability Reporting, Firm Value

Kaynakça

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