Are Shadow Economy and Corruption in US States Substitutive or Complementary? An Empirical Investigation

Yıl 2020, Cilt: 28 Sayı: 46, 11 - 23, 31.10.2020

Ömer Gökçekus , Friedrich Schneıder

https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2020.04.01

Cited By: 4

Öz

An empirical investigation of the 50 US States shows that the relationship between shadow economy and corruption is negative (substitutive) when the shadow economy is relatively small; it is positive (complementary) when the shadow economy is large. According to the robust regression results for 50 American states between 2001 and 2008, the turning point from negative to positive is when the shadow economy of a state is at 7.61 of its GDP. Shadow economy and corruption are first substitutive and then complementary. The lesson to learn is that there is no simple anti-corruption policy rule if one takes into account the varying interaction between corruption and the shadow economy.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Shadow Economy, Corruption, USA

ABD’de Kayıt Dışı Ekonomi ve Yolsuzluk Birbirinin Yerine Mi Geçer Yoksa Birbirini Mi Tamamlar? Ampirik Bir Çalışma

Öz

Bu ampirik çalışma ABD’de kayıt dışı ekonominin küçük olduğu eyaletlerde kayıt dışı ekonomi ve yolsuzluk arasında negatif bir ilişkinin olduğunu (birbirinin yerine geçen); kayıt dışı ekonominin büyük olduğu eyaletlerde ise pozitif (birbirini tamamlayan) olduğunu göstermektedir. 2001-2008 yılları arasında, ABD’deki 50 eyalete ait verilere dayalı yapılan regresyon analiz sonuçlarına göre, bu ilişkinin negatiften pozitife geçtiği dönüm noktası, eyaletteki kayıt dışı ekonominin GSYİH’nın %7,61’i kadar olduğu yerdedir: Kayıt dışı ekonomi ve yolsuzluk önce birbirinin yerine geçmekte daha sonra ise birbirlerini tamamlamaktadırlar. Yolsuzluk ve kayıt dışı ekonomi arasındaki ilişkinin değişken olduğunu göz önüne aldığımızda, yolsuzluğa karşı basit bir politika kuralı olamayacağı ortaya çıkmaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Kayıt Dışı Ekonomi, Yolsuzluk, ABD

Kaynakça

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