Yıl 2021, Cilt 29 , Sayı 48, Sayfalar 59 - 73 2021-04-28

An Evaluation on the GATT, the WTO’s Agreement on Safeguards, and the Dispute Settlement Procedure
GATT, DTÖ Korunma Önlemleri Anlaşması ve Anlaşmazlıkların Halli Mekanizması’na İlişkin Bir Değerlendirme

Volkan SEZGİN [1]


This study focuses on evaluating the General Agreement on Tariffs and Trade (GATT) Article XIX, the World Trade Organization’s (WTO) Agreement on Safeguards (AoS), and the Dispute Settlement Procedure (DSP) for the safeguards by developing a theoretical model. To make a fair comparison, we analyse the timing of the DSP, the political ties between the safeguard imposing country and the countries whose exports are affected from these duties, ex-ante against interim safeguard tariffs, and we present respective extensions over the model initially developed Beshkar (2009). For this purpose, a model design is introduced for GATT, WTO, and DSP to find the incentive- compatible agreement that maximizes political welfare under the AoS, aiming to extend Beshkar’s analyses. We find that determining the safeguard tariff level at an interim step instead of ex-ante leads to the tariff that is politically the best for a country at that instant but does not necessarily lead to an optimal tariff. As a result, we reveal that WTO procedures do not always produce the best tariff options for the parties in safeguard measures.
Bu çalışma, Gümrük Tarifeleri ve Ticaret Genel Antlaşması (GTTA) Madde XIX, Dünya Ticaret Örgütü (DTÖ) Korunma Önlemleri Anlaşması (KÖA) ve Anlaşmazlıkların Halli Prosedürü’nün (AHP) korunma önlemleri kapsamında teorik bir model kullanılarak değerlendirilmesine odaklanmaktadır. Adil bir karşılaştırma yapabilmek adına, Anlaşmazlıkların Halli Prosedürü’nün toplam süreci, korunma önlemi uygulayan ülke ile ihracatları mezkûr önlemden etkilenen diğer ülkeler arasındaki siyasi bağlar ile önceden planlanan korunma tariflerine karşı anlık hesaplanan tarifeler analiz edilmiş ve Beshkar (2009) modeline eklemeler sunulmuştur. Bu amaçla, Beshkar’ın analizini genişletmek maksadıyla, AoS kapsamında siyasi refahı en üst düzeye çıkaran teşvik uyumlu anlaşmayı bulmak için GATT, WTO ve DSP için bir model tasarımı geliştirilmiştir. Korunma tarifelerinin önceden planlananlar yerine anlık olarak belirlenmesinin bir ülke için optimal tarifeye değil, politik olarak o anda uygulanabilecek en iyi tarifeye yol açtığı bulunmuştur. Sonuç olarak, korunma önlemlerine ilişkin olarak Dünya Ticaret Örgütü prosedürlerinin taraflar için her zaman en iyi tarife seçenekleri üretemediği ortaya koyulmaktadır.
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Birincil Dil en
Konular Sosyal
Bölüm Makaleler
Yazarlar

Orcid: 0000-0001-7642-7674
Yazar: Volkan SEZGİN (Sorumlu Yazar)
Kurum: University of Rome Tor Vergata
Ülke: Turkey


Tarihler

Yayımlanma Tarihi : 28 Nisan 2021

Bibtex @araştırma makalesi { sosyoekonomi742977, journal = {Sosyoekonomi}, issn = {1305-5577}, address = {}, publisher = {Sosyoekonomi Derneği}, year = {2021}, volume = {29}, pages = {59 - 73}, doi = {10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2021.02.03}, title = {An Evaluation on the GATT, the WTO’s Agreement on Safeguards, and the Dispute Settlement Procedure}, key = {cite}, author = {Sezgin, Volkan} }
APA Sezgin, V . (2021). An Evaluation on the GATT, the WTO’s Agreement on Safeguards, and the Dispute Settlement Procedure . Sosyoekonomi , 29 (48) , 59-73 . DOI: 10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2021.02.03
MLA Sezgin, V . "An Evaluation on the GATT, the WTO’s Agreement on Safeguards, and the Dispute Settlement Procedure" . Sosyoekonomi 29 (2021 ): 59-73 <https://dergipark.org.tr/tr/pub/sosyoekonomi/issue/62051/742977>
Chicago Sezgin, V . "An Evaluation on the GATT, the WTO’s Agreement on Safeguards, and the Dispute Settlement Procedure". Sosyoekonomi 29 (2021 ): 59-73
RIS TY - JOUR T1 - An Evaluation on the GATT, the WTO’s Agreement on Safeguards, and the Dispute Settlement Procedure AU - Volkan Sezgin Y1 - 2021 PY - 2021 N1 - doi: 10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2021.02.03 DO - 10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2021.02.03 T2 - Sosyoekonomi JF - Journal JO - JOR SP - 59 EP - 73 VL - 29 IS - 48 SN - 1305-5577- M3 - doi: 10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2021.02.03 UR - https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2021.02.03 Y2 - 2021 ER -
EndNote %0 Sosyoekonomi An Evaluation on the GATT, the WTO’s Agreement on Safeguards, and the Dispute Settlement Procedure %A Volkan Sezgin %T An Evaluation on the GATT, the WTO’s Agreement on Safeguards, and the Dispute Settlement Procedure %D 2021 %J Sosyoekonomi %P 1305-5577- %V 29 %N 48 %R doi: 10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2021.02.03 %U 10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2021.02.03
ISNAD Sezgin, Volkan . "An Evaluation on the GATT, the WTO’s Agreement on Safeguards, and the Dispute Settlement Procedure". Sosyoekonomi 29 / 48 (Nisan 2021): 59-73 . https://doi.org/10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2021.02.03
AMA Sezgin V . An Evaluation on the GATT, the WTO’s Agreement on Safeguards, and the Dispute Settlement Procedure. Sosyoekonomi. 2021; 29(48): 59-73.
Vancouver Sezgin V . An Evaluation on the GATT, the WTO’s Agreement on Safeguards, and the Dispute Settlement Procedure. Sosyoekonomi. 2021; 29(48): 59-73.
IEEE V. Sezgin , "An Evaluation on the GATT, the WTO’s Agreement on Safeguards, and the Dispute Settlement Procedure", Sosyoekonomi, c. 29, sayı. 48, ss. 59-73, Nis. 2021, doi:10.17233/sosyoekonomi.2021.02.03