The Event Theory of Hope as an Alternative to Pessimism: A Non-Stoic Approach

Öz

This paper discusses the possibility of a metaphysical event theory that incorporates the concept of hope as a disposition. Hope is interpreted as an expectation regarding future events while representing certain manifestations expected to occur in certain future events. In this sense, for ontologies that deny change or claim that its degree is purely fundamental, hope is a redundant concept in a metaphysical context. Additionally, in a world governed by fatalism or theological determinism it is meaningless to hope for an alternative result. These two interpretations are compatible with a form of Stoicism as they depict a world where hope is redundant. To make hope more meaningful within the framework of event theory, we can propose an alternative view in which hope is considered not merely a psychological phenomenon but also related and more active to metaphysical events. To strengthen this relation, we will change our perspective on our feature ontology and argue that what is hoped for can exist as a dispositional property that is realized as a particular consequence of an event, when it encounters certain stimuli. In examining the relationship between hope and event theory from different ontological perspectives, the first two view hope as a redundant concept for event theories. In contrast, the third perspective reinterprets hope as a disposition, making it more significant for a fundamental ontology.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Hope
• Event Theory
• Metaphysics
• Dispositions
• Time

Karamsarlığa Bir Alternatif Olarak Umudun Olay Teorisi: Stoacı Olmayan Bir Yaklaşım

Öz

Bu makalede umut kavramını bir eğilim olarak kapsayabilecek bir metafizik olay teorisinin imkânı tartışılmaktadır. Umut, gelecekteki olaylara dair bir beklenti olarak yorumlanırken aynı zamanda gelecekte gerçekleşmesi beklenen olaylardaki belirli özellik örneklemelerini de resmeden bir duygu olarak yorumlanabilir. Bu bakımdan değişimi reddeden ya da değişimin derecesinin sadece temel düzeyde var olduğunu iddia eden ontolojiler için umut, metafizik bağlamda lüzumsuz bir kavram olarak görülebilir. Ayrıca kadercilik ya da teolojik determinizmin geçerli olduğu bir dünyada, nedenlerle sonuçlar arasında zorunlu bir bağlantı mevcuttur. Bu tarz bir yorum da umuda ihtiyaç duyulmayan bir dünyayı resmetmesi bakımından bir çeşit Stoacılıkla örtüşmektedir. Umut kavramını bir olay teorisi için daha anlamlı kılmak adına umudun, salt psikolojik bir olgu olmanın ötesinde, metafizik olaylarla ilişkili olduğunu düşünmemiz de mümkündür. Bu ilişkiyi güçlendirmek adına özellik ontolojimize dair bakış açımızı değiştirerek umut edilen şeyin, bir olayın belirli bir sonucu olarak, belirli uyaranlarla karşılaştığında gerçekleşen eğilimsel bir özellik olarak var olabileceği iddia edilecektir. Umut ve olay teorileri arasındaki ilişki bu bakımdan farklı ontolojik perspektifler üzerinden incelenecektir. İlk iki perspektif, umudu olay teorileri için lüzumsuz bir kavram olarak değerlendirirken, üçüncü perspektif umudu ontolojik olarak görece daha anlamlı ve etkin hale getirecek bir eğilimsel özellik olarak yeniden yorumlamaktadır.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Umut
• Olay Teorisi
• Metafizik
• Eğilimler
• Zaman

Kaynakça

1. Azzano, Lorenzo. Dispositional Reality: A Novel Approach to Power Ontology and Metaphysics. Springer Nature, 2024.
2. Bird, Alexander. “Dispositions and Antidotes,” The Philosophical Quarterly (1950-) 48, no. 191 (1998): 227-34. http://www.jstor.org/stable/2660296
3. Brogaard, Berit. “Presentist Four-Dimensionalism,” The Monist 83, no. 3 (2000): 341-356. http://www.jstor.org/stable/27903690
4. Caputo, John D. “Hoping Against Hope: The Possibility of the Impossible,” Journal of Pastoral Theology 26, no. 2 (2016): 91-101.
5. Chignell, Andrew. “The Focus Theory of Hope,” The Philosophical Quarterly 73, no. 1 (2023): 44–63. https://doi.org/10.1093/pq/pqac010
6. Churchland, Paul M. “Eliminative Materialism and the Propositional Attitudes,” The Journal of Philosophy 78, no. 2 (1981): 67-90. https://doi.org/10.2307/2025900
7. Clarke, Randolph. “Dispositions, Abilities to Act, and Free Will: The New Dispositionalism,” Mind 118, no. 470 (2009): 323-351.
8. Decock, Lieven. “Domestic Ontology and Ideology” in Quine: Naturalized Epistemology, Perceptual Knowledge and Ontology, Editörler: Lieven Decock ve Leon Horsten, 189-205. Brill, 2000.

9. Dennett, Daniel C. The Intentional Stance. MIT Press, 1987.
10. Fritz, James. “Ethics and epistemic hopelessness,” Inquiry 66, no. 6 (2020): 977-1005. https://doi.org/10.1080/0020174X.2020.1729235
11. Hankinson, Robert J. “Parmenides and the Metaphysics of Changelessness” in Presocratic Philosophy: Essays in Honour of Alexander Mourelatos, Editörler: V. Caston ve D. W. Graham, 65-80. Routledge, 2002.
12. Hayes, Andrew. “Does God Have a Plan?,” New Blackfriars 98, no. 1073 (2017): 63-72.
13. Jankowski, Peter J. ve Steven J. Sandage. “Meditative Prayer, Hope, Adult Attachment, and Forgiveness: A Proposed Model,” Psychology of Religion and Spirituality 3, no. 2 (2011): 115-131.
14. Kim, Jaegwon. “Supervenience and Mental Causation,” Philosophical Perspectives 7, (1993): 1-23. https://doi.org/10.2307/2214203
15. Kodaj, Daniel. “From dispositions to possible worlds,” Erkenntnis (2024). https://doi.org/10.1007/s10670-023-00781-5
16. Kontos, Pavlos. “Hoping-well: Aristotle’s phenomenology of elpis,” British Journal for the History of Philosophy 29, no. 3 (2020): 415-434. https://doi.org/10.1080/09608788.2020.1818054
17. Kraay, Klaas J. “Can God Satisfice?,” American Philosophical Quarterly 50, no. 4 (2013): 399-410. http://www.jstor.org/stable/24475358
18. Lombard, Lawrence B. “Event Theory” in A Companion to Metaphysics, Editörler: Jaegwon Kim, Ernest Sosa ve G. S. Rosenkrantz, 235-239. Wiley-Blackwell, 2009.
19. Lundsgaard-Leth, Kresten. “The Temporality, Modality and Materiality of Hope” in Hope in All Directions, Editör: Geoffrey Karabin, 213-220. Brill, 2013.
20. McTaggart, John. M. E. “The Unreality of Time,” Mind 17, no. 68 (1908): 457-474.
21. Meyer, Susan Sauvé. “Fate, fatalism, and agency in Stoicism,” Social Philosophy and Policy 16, no. 2 (1999): 250-273.
22. Naar, Hichem. “A Dispositional Theory of Love,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 94, no. 3 (2013): 342-357. https://doi.org/10.1111/papq.12003
23. Naar, Hichem. “Love as a Disposition” in The Oxford Handbook of the Philosophy of Love, Editörler: C. Grau ve A. Smuts. Oxford University Press, 2017. https://doi.org/10.1093/oxfordhb/9780199395729.013.11
24. Reddoch, Jason. “The Stoics on Hope and Fear: How to Be a Politically Engaged Stoic,” Soundings: An Interdisciplinary Journal 101, no. 1 (2018): 52-66. https://doi.org/10.5325/soundings.101.1.0052
25. Rubio, Daniel. “In Defence of No Best World,” Australasian Journal of Philosophy 98, no. 4 (2020): 811-825. https://doi.org/10.1080/00048402.2019.1699588
26. Schaffer, Jonathan. “Naturalistic Dualism and the Problem of the Physical Correlate,” Taslak Makale, 2020. Erişim 15 Eylül 2024. https://www.jonathanschaffer.org/dualismcorrelate.pdf
27. Sider, Theodore. Four-Dimensionalism: An Ontology of Persistence and Time. Oxford University Press, 2001.
28. Stich, Stephen ve Ravenscroft, Ian. “What Is Folk Psychology?,” Cognition 50, no. 1–3 (1994): 447-468. https://doi.org/10.1016/0010-0277(94)90040-X
29. Tucker, Chris. “Divine Satisficing and the Ethics of the Problem of Evil,” Faith and Philosophy 37, no. 1 (2020): 32-56.
30. Van Inwagen, Peter. The Problem of Evil. Oxford University Press, 2006.
31. Waterworth, Jayne M. “An Analysis of Everyday Hope” in A Philosophical Analysis of Hope, 3-30. Londra: Palgrave Macmillan UK, 2004.
32. Welshon, Rex. “Anomalous Monism and Epiphenomenalism,” Pacific Philosophical Quarterly 80, no. 1 (1999): 103-120.
33. Westphal, Jonathan. The Mind-Body Problem. MIT Press, 2016.
34. White, Heath. Fate and Free Will: A Defense of Theological Determinism. University of Notre Dame Press, 2019.