Gelir Eşitsizliği ve Merkez Bankası Bağımsızlığı İlişkisi: JKS Panel Granger Nedensellik Analizi

Öz

Geçtiğimiz yıllar içinde, bağımsız merkez bankaları ile gelir dağılımı adaleti arasında bir ödünleşimin bulunduğuna dair bir bakış açısı ortaya çıkmıştır. Öte yandan, merkez bankası bağımsızlığı ile gerçekleştirilen uygulamaların gelir eşitsizliğini azaltabileceği savunulmaktadır. Bunun yanı sıra, para politikası değişkenlerinin uzun dönemde yansız veya yansıza yakın olduğu; gelir dağılımı üzerinde herhangi bir etki yaratmayacağına ilişkin bir bakış açısı da mevcuttur. Çalışmanın amacı, 41 orta ve yüksek gelirli ülke için 2000-2020 döneminde gelir eşitsizliği ile merkez bankası bağımsızlığı arasındaki ilişkinin ampirik olarak analiz edilmesidir. Ayrıca, sosyal harcamalar, tüketici fiyat endeksi ve finansal gelişme endeksi analize dâhil edilmiştir. Analiz metodu olarak Juodis, Karavias ve Sarafidis (2021) ile ortaya koyulan JKS- Panel Granger Nedensellik Sınaması kullanılmıştır. Sonuçlar, sosyal harcamalar, finansal gelişme, tüketici fiyat endeksi ve merkez bankası bağımsızlığı değişkenlerinin yer aldığı model düzeyinde Granger nedensellik ilişkisinin varlığına işaret etmektedir. Ayrıca, merkez bankası bağımsızlığı endeksi değişken bazında gelir eşitsizliği üzerinde anlamlı nedensel bir etkiye sahiptir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• gelir eştsizliği
• merkez bankası bağımsızlığı
• panel nedensellik testi

The Relationship between Income Inequality and Central Bank Independence: A JKS Panel Granger Causality Analysis

Abstract

In recent years, a perspective has emerged suggesting that there is a trade-off between central bank independence and income distribution justice. On the other hand, it is also argued that policies implemented under central bank independence may contribute to a reduction in income inequality. In addition, there exists a view that monetary policy variables are neutral or nearly neutral in the long run and therefore do not have any effect on income distribution. The aim of this study is to empirically analyze the relationship between income inequality and central bank independence for 41 middle- and high-income countries over the period 2000–2020. Moreover, social expenditures, the consumer price index, and the financial development index are included in the analysis. As the methodological approach, the JKS Panel Granger Causality Test developed by Juodis, Karavias, and Sarafidis (2021) is employed. The results indicate the presence of a Granger causality relationship at the model level, where social expenditures, financial development, the consumer price index, and central bank independence are jointly included. In addition, the central bank independence index has a statistically significant causal effect on income inequality at the variable level.

Keywords

• income inequality
• central bank independence
• panel causality test

Kaynakça

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