The Production and Dissemination of Knowledge and Positive Externalities: A Game Theoretic Approach

Yıl 2023, Cilt: 14 Sayı: 39, 775 - 786, 25.08.2023

Özgür Hakan Aydoğmuş , Erkan Gürpınar

https://doi.org/10.21076/vizyoner.1217047

Öz

The study of how knowledge is produced and disseminated is critical for understanding today's information-intensive economies. The useful knowledge in the knowledge economy and the information society does not only include formally-based knowledge produced in research labs, universities, and firms, typically based on R&D. In the market, in addition to market-based social networks, knowledge, news, and technology are produced in (local and global) communities, and this knowledge is also essential for the efficient functioning of the market economy. This more informal knowledge can vary in time and space and is not only spread through business contracts and sales agreements. This type of knowledge can also be disseminated through many implicit and/or non-verbal methods, just like implicit knowledge. In the study, the dynamics of knowledge production and dissemination are examined using game theory. In cases where implicit knowledge is important in the dissemination of knowledge, it is shown that actors who contribute to knowledge production often benefit more from the positive externalities arising from the dissemination of knowledge than actors who do not contribute.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Tacit Knowledge, Positive Externalities, Game Theory

Bilginin Üretilmesi ve Yayılmasında Pozitif Dışsallıklar: Oyun Teorisi Yaklaşımı

Öz

Bilginin nasıl üretildiğinin ve yayıldığının incelenmesi günümüz bilgi yoğun ekonomilerinin anlaşılması için kritik öneme sahiptir. Bilgi ekonomisi ve onu kapsayan bilgi toplumunda yararlı bilgi, sadece araştırma laboratuvarlarında, üniversitelerde ve firmalarda üretilen ve genellikle Ar&Ge’ye dayalı formel bilgiyi kapsamamaktadır. Piyasada; piyasa dışındaki sosyal ağlarda; bilgi, haber, teknoloji üretilen (yerel ve küresel) topluluklarda da yararlı bilgi üretilmekte olup bu bilgiler de en az formel bilgi kadar piyasa ekonomisinin etkin bir şekilde işlemesi için gereklidir. Daha enformel olan bu çeşit bilgi zamana ve mekâna göre değişiklik göstermekte ve kişiler arasında sadece iş sözleşmesi, satış sözleşmesi gibi yollarla yayılmamaktadır. Bu tür bilgi, örtük bilgide olduğu gibi sözlü ve/veya sözsüz birçok yöntemle yayılabilmektedir. Bu çalışmada bilgi üretilmesi ve yayılmasının dinamikleri oyun teorisi kullanılarak incelenmektedir. Çalışmada, örtük bilginin bilgi yayılmasında önemli olduğu durumlarda, bilgi üretimine katkıda bulunan aktörlerin bilginin yayılmasının ortaya çıkardığı pozitif dışsallıklardan katkıda bulunmayan aktörlere göre çoğu zaman daha fazla yararlandıkları gösterilmektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Örtük Bilgi, Pozitif Dışsallıklar, Oyun Teorisi

Kaynakça

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