ISSUE SALIENCE, POLITICAL SURVIVAL AND DIVERSIONARY USE OF FORCE

Yıl 2017, , 172 - 195, 30.09.2017

İmran Demir

https://doi.org/10.11611/yead.332364

Öz

Earlier research examining
the effects of regime type on diversionary use of force has overlooked the
possibility that leaders of different regimes are vulnerable to different domestic
pressures. This study seeks to develop a more complete perspective on
diversionary behavior of leaders executing under different institutional
constraints by emphasizing issue salience. It contends that leaders of
different regimes will divert under different domestic political and economic
pressures. Empirical results demonstrate that while autocratic leaders divert
more regularly under the pressure of domestic unrest, democratic leaders pursue
aggression in foreign policy when they experience declines in GDP per capita.
Leaders of mixed regimes, on the other hand, display external aggression under
inflationary pressures. It is argued that the differential impact of GDP per
capita and inflation on diversionary behavior of democratic and mixed regimes
is the consequence of separate economic policy choices, which are conditioned
by concern for political survival.    

Anahtar Kelimeler

Diversion, Conflict, Regime Type, İssue Salience, Political Survival

SORUN EHEMMİYETİ, İKTİDARIN İDAMESİ ve HEDEF SAPTIRMA AMAÇLI SALDIRGAN DIŞ POLİTİKA

Öz

Rejim şeklinin hedef
saptırma amaçlı saldırgan dış politika eğilimlerine yaptığı etki üzerine
yapılan geçmiş çalışmalar rejim liderlerinin rejim farklılıklarından kaynaklanan
sebeplerden dolayı farklı sorunlara farklı tepki gösterebileceği olasılığını
göz ardı etmiş bulunuyor. Bu çalışma rejim farklılıklarından kaynaklanan zafiyet
farklılıklarının dikkate alınması gerektiğini öne sürerek rejim şekli ve hedef
saptırma amaçlı saldırgan dış politika arasındaki ilişkiye daha kapsamlı bir perspektif
geliştirmektedir. Çalışma, farklı rejim liderlerinin içerideki farklı ekonomik
ve politik baskılar karşısında hedef saptırma eğilimi taşıyacağını iddia etmektedir.
Elde edilen ampirik sonuçlar otokratik rejimlerin daha çok toplumsal çatışmalar
karşısında hedef saptırma eğiliminde olduklarını gösterirken demokratik rejim liderlerinin
dış politikadaki saldırgan eğilimlerinin gayri safi milli hasılada yaşanan
düşüşler karşısında arttığı gözlenmektedir. Karma rejim liderlerinin ise
enflasyon baskısı altında saldırganlaştığı görülmektedir. Gayri safi milli
hasıla ve enflasyonun demokratik ve karma rejimlerde yarattığı farklı tepkinin
iktidarlarını idame etme kaygısıyla izlenen ekonomik politikalardaki farklılıktan
kaynaklandığı ileri sürülmektedir. 

 

Anahtar Kelimeler

Hedef Saptırma, Çatışma, Rejim Türü, Konu Ehemmiyeti, İktidarın İdamesi

Kaynakça

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