An Overview of The Factors Determining Tax Compliance

Yıl 2016, , 805 - 816, 27.12.2016

Volkan Yurdadoğ , Ramazan Gökbunar Barış Tunçay

https://doi.org/10.18657/yonveek.281968

Cited By: 3

Öz

               The right to collect taxes is
one of the independence indicators of the states. Given the history of the
world, there seems to be no state that did not collect taxes from citizens. Topics
such as voluntary tax compliance and tax evasion are dated back to the taxation
itself. They have constituted an important research area since the early days
of tax collection practices. Today, there ise a search for answers in the
relevant literature to the following questions; “Why do people pay taxes?” or
“Why are people reluctant to pay taxes?”.  There is a variety of factors affecting tax
compliance that incorporates a range of dimensions including interalia
economic, socio-psychological, political, ethical, administrative and legal.
Due to the growing need for the establishment of a sustainable public finance
system across the world, there is an intensive research agenda on tax
compliance. Overall, the purpose of this study is to discuss the factors that
affect and determine tax compliance.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Tax Compliance, Tax Evasion, Tax Audit

Vergi Uyumunu Belirleyen Faktörlere Genel Bir Bakış

Öz

          Vergi toplama
hakkı, devletlerin bağımsızlık göstergelerinden birisidir. Dünya tarihine
bakıldığında vatandaşlarından  vergi toplamayan hiçbir devlet olmadığı
görülmektedir. Gönüllü vergi uyumu ve vergi kaçakçılığı gibi konular, verginin
kendisi kadar eski olup, verginin varlığından bu yana önemli araştırma alanları
olmuştur. Günümüzde de vergi  uyumu literatüründe kişiler  “niçin vergi öderler ya da niçin vergi ödemek
istemezler?” sorularına cevap aranmaktadır. Ekonomik,  sosyo-psikolojik,  politik,
etik,  yönetimsel
ve hukuki boyutları olan vergi  uyumunu belirleyen faktörler çok
çeşitlidir. Tüm ülkelerde giderek artan şekilde  sürdürülebilir
bir kamu finansmanı oluşturulması ihtiyacı  nedeniyle  vergi
uyumu üzerinde yoğun bir şekilde araştırmalar yapılmaktadır. Çalışmada amaç,
vergi uyumunu belirleyen faktörleri genel olarak  incelemektir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

Vergi Uyumu, Vergi Kaçakçılığı, Vergi Denetimi

Kaynakça

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