Avrupa Birliği’ne Katılım Sürecinde Karadağ: AB Koşulluluğu, Müzakere Performansı ve Kurumsal Dönüşümün Sınırları

Öz

Bu çalışma, Karadağ’ın Avrupa Birliği’ne katılım sürecini AB koşulluluğu, müzakere performansı ve kurumsal dönüşümün sınırları bağlamında incelemektedir. Çalışmanın temel amacı, Karadağ’ın 2024 sonrasında hız kazanan müzakere sürecinin hukukun üstünlüğü, kamu yönetimi ve yolsuzlukla mücadele alanlarında kalıcı ve işlevsel kurumsal dönüşüme ne ölçüde yansıdığını değerlendirmektir. Araştırma, nitel belge analizi ve politika analizi yöntemine dayanmaktadır. Avrupa Birliği kurumlarının güncel belgeleri, Avrupa Konseyi ve Ekonomik İşbirliği ve Kalkınma Örgütü/Yönetişim ve Yönetimi Geliştirme Desteği (Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Support for Improvement in Governance and Management, OECD/SIGMA) gibi teknik izleme raporları, demokrasi göstergeleri ve AB koşulluluğu literatürü birlikte değerlendirilmiştir. Bulgular, Karadağ’ın teknik müzakere performansı bakımından Batı Balkanlar’daki en ileri adaylardan biri olduğunu göstermektedir. Olumlu Geçici Kriterler Değerlendirme Raporu (Interim Benchmark Assessment Report, IBAR) süreci, ardışık fasıl kapanışları, Reform Agenda, Tek Avro Ödeme Alanı’na (Single Euro Payments Area, SEPA) katılım ve Growth Plan kapsamındaki destekler bu ilerlemeyi güçlendirmiştir. Bununla birlikte hukukun üstünlüğü, yargı hesap verebilirliği, kamu yönetiminde liyakat ve yüksek düzey yolsuzlukla mücadele alanlarında uygulama açığı devam etmektedir. Çalışma, bu açığın idari kapasiteyle tek başına açıklanamayacağını, yargı atamaları, siyasal maliyetler, kurumsal direnç ve hesap verebilirlik mekanizmalarıyla birlikte değerlendirilmesi gerektiğini ortaya koymaktadır. Karadağ örneği, AB koşulluluğunun alanlara göre farklılaşan ve uygulama sonuçlarına bağlı olarak değişen çok katmanlı bir mekanizma olduğunu göstermektedir.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Karadağ
• Avrupa Birliği
• AB Koşulluluğu
• Müzakere Performansı
• Kurumsal Dönüşüm

Destekleyen Kurum

Yoktur.

Etik Beyan

Çalışmada katılımcılardan anket, görüşme, gözlem ya da deney yoluyla birincil veri veya kişisel veri içeren herhangi bir içerik kullanılmamıştır. Bu nedenle etik kurul onayı gerekmemektedir.

Montenegro’s Accession to the European Union: EU Conditionality, Negotiation Performance and the Limits of Institutional Transformation

Öz

This study examines Montenegro’s accession to the European Union in the context of EU conditionality, negotiation performance, and the limits of institutional transformation. The main aim of the study is to assess the extent to which Montenegro’s accelerated negotiation process after 2024 has translated into durable and functional institutional transformation in the fields of the rule of law, public administration, and anti-corruption. The research is based on qualitative document analysis and policy analysis. Current documents of European Union institutions, technical monitoring reports by bodies such as the Council of Europe and the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development/Support for Improvement in Governance and Management (OECD/SIGMA), democracy indicators, and the literature on EU conditionality are evaluated together. The findings show that Montenegro is among the most advanced candidates in the Western Balkans in terms of technical negotiation performance. The positive Interim Benchmark Assessment Report (IBAR) process, successive chapter closures, the Reform Agenda, participation in the Single Euro Payments Area (SEPA), and support under the Growth Plan have strengthened this progress. However, an implementation gap persists in the fields of the rule of law, judicial accountability, merit-based public administration, and high-level anti-corruption efforts. The study argues that this gap cannot be explained solely by administrative capacity and should be assessed in relation to judicial appointments, political costs, institutional resistance, and accountability mechanisms. The Montenegrin case shows that EU conditionality operates as a multi-layered mechanism whose effects vary across policy areas and depend on implementation outcomes.

Anahtar Kelimeler

• Montenegro
• European Union
• EU Conditionality
• Negotiation Performance
• Institutional Transformation

Destekleyen Kurum

None.

Etik Beyan

The study did not involve the collection of primary data or any content containing personal data through surveys, interviews, observations, or experiments with participants. Therefore, ethical approval was not required

Kaynakça

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